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THE SUPERIORITY OF AN IDEAL

CONSUMPTION TAX OVER AN IDEAL
INCOME TAX
Joseph Bankman* and David A. Weisbach**
This Article considers the arguments regardingthe choice between an ideal
income tax and an ideal consumption tax,focusing on an argumentfirst made by
Atkinson and Stiglitz regardingneutral taxation of commodities. This argument
shows that, under its assumptions, a properlydesigned consumption tax is Pareto
superiorto an income tax: it is either more efficient, more redistributive,or both.
The Article illustrates the Atkinson-Stiglitz argument using the simple case in
which investments produce risk-free returns,and individuals vary by theirability.
It then considers more complex cases, such as risky returns, inherited wealth,
heterogeneous savings rates, and the possibility of additional returns to savings,
such as power, prestige, and security. Finally, it examines qualifications to the
argument and circumstances under which an optimal tax might providefor some
taxation of interest income.
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INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the single most important tax policy decision is the choice
between an income tax and a consumption tax. The topic has been discussed
and argued over since at least the time of Hobbes and Mill, without apparent
resolution.' Consumption and income taxes both represent substantial sources
of revenue in all modem economies.
This Article considers the choice between an income tax and a
consumption tax, focusing on an argument first made by Anthony Atkinson and
Joseph Stiglitz in 1976 ("AS 1976"). AS 1976 shows (under the assumptions of
the model) that taxes should be imposed on all commodities at the same ratethat is, taxes should be neutral. For reasons illustrated below, this conclusion
implies that a consumption tax is superior to an income tax. AS 1976 has
recently attracted substantial attention in the economics literature but, perhaps
because the arguments are technical, has yet to receive any attention in the
legal literature. 2 Our primary task here is to explain the intuition behind AS
1976 and explore its implications for the income tax versus consumption tax
debate. In addition, we examine what happens when some of the strict
assumptions of AS 1976 are relaxed and, in doing so, revisit a number of
arguments that have been made in favor of income taxes. We conclude that,
based on current understanding, ideal consumption taxes are superior to ideal
income taxes.
We will generally compare only the ideal forms of income and
consumption taxation. The actual choice of a tax system has to be based on

1. The literature is immense. See, e.g., ALAN J. AUERBACH & LAWRENCE J. KOTLIKOFF,
DYNAMIC FISCAL POLICY (1987); DAVID F. BRADFORD & THE U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY
STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (2d ed. 1984); IRVING FISHER, THE NATURE OF
CAPITAL AND INCOME (1906); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651); NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN
EXPENDITURE TAX (1955); JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1871);
DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE (2000); David F. Bradford, The Casefor a Personal
Consumption Tax, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR CONSUMPTION? 75 (Joseph A.
Peckman ed., 1980); William Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974);

Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the

Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961 (1992); Michael Graetz, Implementing a
Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (1979); Alvin Warren, Would a
Consumption Tax Be Fairerthan an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980).
2. There are some hints of the argument in the legal literature but no cites to the paper.
For example, prior to the publication of AS 1976, Andrews suggested a similar argument.
Andrews, supra note 1, at 1174-75. Daniel Shaviro recently made an argument similar to AS
1976. Daniel Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax, 103
TAX NOTES 91 (2004). The economics literature has also not fully absorbed their argument.
For example, JANE GRAVELLE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAXING CAPITAL INCOME (1994),

makes arguments that were refuted in AS 1976.
AS 1976 has been cited in the legal literature with respect to a related but distinct
consideration: whether legal rules should be used to redistribute income. See, e.g., Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
RedistributingIncome, 23 J. LEGAL STUD, 667 (1994).
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how the system would be implemented, focusing on administrative and
compliance costs. Neither an income tax nor a consumption tax would likely be
implemented in its pure form, and differences in administrative and compliance
costs might be dispositive in the choice between the two. Nevertheless, it is
worth examining the ideal forms for two reasons. First, determining which
ideal form is most desirable helps us design actual systems and helps us
understand the flaws of actual systems-ideals matter in tax reform.
Second, the case for the income tax is likely to be strongest if the
comparison is made between ideal forms. This is true because the income taxes
we have had for almost a century are much worse than the ideal income tax,
and they contain structural features that make reform difficult. For example, an
ideal income tax would tax the change in the value of investments each year.
Under existing law, the change in investment value is taxed only if it is
"realized" in the form of a sale or exchange. The so-called realization
requirement is responsible for much of the current complexity and distortion.
Elimination of that requirement, however, raises difficult liquidity and
valuation issues and, in part for those reasons, has never been seriously
considered. An ideal income tax would also measure gain and loss on an
inflation-adjusted basis. Inflation adjustments, while possible, would be
difficult and also have never been seriously considered. A consumption tax
raises neither of these difficulties, and most scholars believe that a consumption
tax is easier to administer, and can be administered in purer form, than an
income tax. By comparing ideal systems and ignoring administration costs, we
are deliberately making the best possible case for the income tax. If a
consumption tax is superior to an income tax even ignoring the major
implementation problems of an income tax, it follows that a consumption tax
will be even more desirable once those problems are taken into account.
Part I of this Article presents the core argument, focusing on the simplest
case, in which investments produce only risk-free, time-value returns, and
individuals vary by their ability. Income taxes tax the risk-free return while
consumption taxes do not. In this simple world, the AS 1976 arguments show
that a consumption tax can be structured to be a Pareto improvement over an
income tax. Importantly, this argument addresses both efficiency and
redistributive concerns. Everyone is equally well off or better off under a
properly designed consumption tax. It is either more efficient, more
redistributive, or both.
The AS 1976 model, like all models, contains assumptions and
simplifications. To understand the practical impact of the AS 1976 arguments,
we need to understand the realism of the assumptions and the effect of relaxing
them. The remaining Parts of the Article consider these issues. We consider the
four most prominent issues and show that the conclusions from the simplified
world of only risk-free investments carry through, almost in their entirety, to
more realistic cases.
Part II considers the taxation of risky returns and economic profits.
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Extension of the basic case to risky returns and profits is straightforward. There
is a long line of literature showing that ideal, flat-rate income and consumption
taxes treat risky returns and economic profits the same way, leaving the riskfree rate of return as the only difference, as discussed in Part I. Part II very
briefly explains this literature and then discusses whether imposing graduated
rates on capital income changes the conclusions.
Part III considers how labor income and wealth are related and the extent
to which the possibility of wealth without labor income affects the arguments.
One might think, for example, that because they tax capital income, income
taxes are better at capturing the benefits of inheritances. Part III shows that if
correctly implemented, a consumption tax can tax such wealth; therefore, such
wealth should not affect the choice between the two tax bases.
Part IV considers the difference between spenders and savers and whether
savers are better off in a manner that would support an income tax. The basic
argument given in Part I assumes that within an earnings or ability class,
individuals make similar savings decisions. In the real world, there may be
significant heterogeneity in savings, and this heterogeneity has been thought by
some to support an income tax. Part IV argues that it does not.
Part V examines the argument that savings brings prestige, power, and
security and that the benefit of savings is more than future consumption. This
extra benefit of savings is thought by some to support an income tax. Part V
shows that this is not the case. Consumption taxes properly tax the benefits
from savings.
The AS 1976 model, like all models, is subject to a number of
qualifications and extensions. The economics literature examining and
extending AS 1976 is large and complex. Our goal here is to explore the core
arguments that arise from the literature and their practical implications. Newer
models show that a complete, optimal tax analysis could produce exotic taxes
that look like neither a pure consumption tax nor a pure income tax. These
models may also help explain deviations from pure income and consumption
taxes (such as deductions granted to particular types of individuals or activities)
that might otherwise seem troubling. In Part VI, we will briefly discuss the
possibility that newer models might show that a tax on savings is desirable.
Before we begin the analysis, we should clarify our terminology and the
origins of the ideas explored here. Throughout the Article, we will refer to the
argument as originating with AS 1976 because that paper was the first in a line
of papers on the topic. AS 1976 and many later papers in the economics
literature analyzed the problem of taxation by assuming that there was a
perfectly designed and implemented labor income or consumption tax in place
and asked whether any small perturbations from such a tax were desirable. 3 An
3. The literature taking this approach is large. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto
Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics, in 2 HANDBOOK OF

PUBLIC ECONOMICS 991 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987); Robin Boadway
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alternative method of analyzing the problem was first developed by Hylland
and Zeckhauser and substantially strengthened and extended by Kaplow. 4 This
method uses a "replicating tax" argument. It starts with a nonneutral
commodity tax and shows how to construct a Pareto superior neutral tax. This
latter method of analyzing the problem has two key strengths. First, it extends
the result to cases in which a labor income or commodity tax is not optimal,
which is extremely important for applying the argument to the real world.
Second, the analysis is more direct and intuitive. We follow the
Hylland/Zeckhauser and Kaplow method of analysis here; to avoid constant
parsing of which paper in the economics literature developed which idea,
however, we simply refer to the entire literature as AS 1976.
I. THE CORE ARGUMENT
A. Basic Definitionsand RelationshipsBetween the Bases

We begin with the simplest case. We assume in this Part that investments
produce only the risk-free, time-value return and that individuals vary by their
ability to earn. All of the AS 1976 intuitions can be illustrated in this simple
case. We relax these strict assumptions in later Parts.
As is well known, the difference between an income tax and a
consumption tax is the taxation of the return to savings or capital income. In a
consumption tax, the risk-free return to investing is exempt, while in an income
tax, the return is taxed.
A consumption tax, as a matter of legal implementation, is imposed on
consumption and not on labor, but it is economically equivalent to a tax on
labor earnings. The reason is that on a going-forward basis, there are two
sources of consumption: earnings from labor (wages) and earnings from
capital. If, under5 a consumption tax, capital income is not taxed, all that is left
to tax is wages.
et al., Redistribution with Unobservable Bequests: A Case for Taxing Capital Income, 102
SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 253 (2000); Helmuth Cremer et al., Direct Versus Indirect
Taxation: The Design of the Tax Structure Revisited, 42 INT'L ECON. REV. 781 (2001);

Angus Deaton, Optimal Taxes and the Structure of Preferences, 49 ECONOMETRICA 1245
(1981); Roger H. Gordon, Taxation of Interest Income, 11 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 5 (2004);
J.A. Mirrlees, Optimal Tax Theory, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 327 (1976); Joseph E. Stiglitz, SelfSelection and ParetoEfficient Taxation, 17 J. PU. ECON. 213 (1982).
4. See Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, DistributionalObjectives ShouldAffect
Taxes but Not ProgramChoice or Design, 81 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 264 (1979). Hylland
and Zeckhauser's article was substantially strengthened and extended by Louis Kaplow, On
the Undesirability of Commodity Taxation Even When Income Taxation Is Not Optimal

(Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Discussion Paper No. 470, 2004) [hereinafter
Kaplow, Undesirability of Commodity Taxation], and Louis Kaplow, Taxation and
Redistribution, ch. 6 (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
5. There are significant differences between the two in actual implementation. For
example, not all labor earnings are paid out as wages, which means that a wage tax might
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Another way to see that a consumption tax is a tax on labor earnings is to
imagine a consumption tax imposed when consumption goods are purchased,
as is the case in a retail sales tax. The tax on purchases will reduce the value of
a dollar earned in exactly the same way that a direct tax on earnings would. For
example, suppose all commodities face a 30% tax when purchased.6 If an
individual has $100 of labor earnings, he can consume only $70 of goods. The
benefit of working hard enough to earn $100 has been reduced by 30%. We
could equivalently have taxed the $100 when earned, leaving the individual
with $70 to spend as he pleases.
Note that a tax on consumption purchases does not burden capital income.
Suppose, for example, the individual, subject to the retail sales tax, waits until
next year to consume, investing his $100 in the market at a 10% rate of return.
He will have $110 next year and will be able to consume $77 after paying the
30% taxes on his purchases. This result is the same as if we taxed his labor
income when earned at 30%, and he invested his after-tax $70 in the market at
a 10% rate of return.
When we refer to an ideal, neutral, or uniform consumption tax, we mean
that the consumption tax is imposed at the same rate on all consumption. Note
that this includes consumption occurring in different time periods as well as
different forms of consumption in the same period. For example, the 30% retail
sales tax considered above imposes the same 30% rate on consumption
whenever it occurs.. A nonneutral or nonuniform consumption (or commodity)
tax imposes different tax rates on different commodities or forms of
consumption. For example, a nonneutral consumption or commodity tax might
impose a 20% rate on one type of good and a 40% rate on another.
Neutral consumption taxes can be progressive. Individuals with more
consumption can face higher average or marginal tax rates even while those
rates are imposed uniformly on all of their purchases. The easiest way to
envision this progressivity is through a wage tax with graduated rates, but there
7
are other methods of implementing such a system.

not capture all labor income. A wage tax will also not tax economic profits, while a welldesigned consumption tax will.
6. Throughout, we will use tax-inclusive terminology, so that a 30% tax on a $100
purchase includes the tax paid, leaving only $70 of goods. We could alternatively express
the same tax as a 43% tax on the $70 purchase. Taxpayers in this case would purchase $70
of goods and pay an additional tax of $30, leaving them $100 out of pocket. It is common to
express retail sales or commodity taxes on a tax-exclusive basis and wage taxes on a taxinclusive basis. To avoid switching between the two methods of expressing taxes, we use
only tax-inclusive terminology here.
7. One system that has received substantial attention in recent years is a value-added
tax (VAT) that allows a deduction for wages and imposes a tax on wages at the individual
level at increasing marginal rates. This system has been proposed under various names, such
as the Flat Tax, the X-Tax, and the SAT. See DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME
TAx (1986); ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAx (2d ed. 1995); Charles
McLure, Economic, Administrative, and Political Factors in Choosing a General
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An ideal income tax, like an ideal consumption tax, will impose the same
nominal rate on the entire tax base (and, like a consumption tax, can be made
progressive by imposing graduated marginal rates, among other methods).
Because it taxes the returns to savings, however, an income tax can be thought
of as imposing a higher rate of tax on future consumption than on current
consumption. To see this, recall the Haig-Simons definition of income as the
sum of consumption plus change in wealth in a given time period. The first
component, consumption, is just like an ideal consumption tax (uniform on all
consumption) and taxes all consumption, whether present or future, at the same
marginal rate. The second component, the tax on the return to savings, reduces
the benefit of savings, making future consumption relatively more expensive
than current consumption.
We can (and will) think of an income tax as a nonneutral consumption (or
sales or commodity) tax in the sense that it imposes different rates on
consumption choices in different time periods. That is, the choice between an
income tax and consumption tax can be seen as part of the more general
question of whether any uneven or nonneutral commodity tax is desirable.
To illustrate this numerically, consider an individual, Z, who earns $100 in
period one and is considering whether to spend the sum in period one or two.
Assume arbitrarily that the pretax rate of interest is 5%. Absent taxes on
interest income, Z could either consume $100 of goods in period one or save
the $100, earn 5%, and consume $105 of goods in period two. The $105 of
goods in period two have a present value to the individual of $100. Assume
now that the return to savings is taxed at a 40% rate and is thus reduced to 3%.
Z now must choose between consuming $100 in period one or $103 in period
two. This reduction from $105 to $103 has the same effect as a sales tax of
about 2% on consumption in period two. If discount rates remain constant at
5%, the market value of available period two consumption drops to $98.10.8
The effective tax rate levied on future-consumed goods increases as the
time of consumption grows more distant. If, in the above example,
consumption is deferred for three years, the tax reduces available consumption
from $116 to $109-the equivalent of a sales tax of 6.4%. After thirty years,
the amount available is reduced from about $430 to $240. This is equivalent to
a sales tax of approximately 80%. The choice between an income tax and a
consumption tax can be restated as the question of whether such a sales tax is
desirable. As such, this question is part of the general issue of whether and
when nonneutral commodity taxes are desirable.

Consumption Tax, 46 NAT'L TAX J. 345 (1993).
8. The burden to Z of the sales tax would be reduced to the extent the tax is borne by

borrowers; to the extent that occurs, the before-tax rate of return will rise. The incidence of
the tax, however, does not change its characterization as a sales tax. Sales taxes may also be
shifted between buyers and sellers.
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B. Argumentsfor an Income Tax
There is a large literature on the choice between an income tax and a
consumption tax, split in its support of one or the other.9 While there are
numerous arguments on the issue, we believe that there are three reasons why
many prefer an income tax to a consumption tax. The first is an efficiency
argument, which concludes that the determination of whether a consumption
tax is more efficient than an income tax depends on empirically unknowable or
indeterminate facts and that, therefore, there should be no presumption that one
is more efficient than the other. The second is that an income tax is better at
redistribution. This argument states that since the efficiency effects of the
choice between a consumption and an income tax are ambiguous and possibly
unknowable but there are clear distributive gains under the income tax system,
we should support an income tax. The third argument is that wealth is thought
to bring a host of benefits, such as power, prestige, and security and an income
tax is more effective than a consumption tax at taxing these benefits.
The efficiency argument, which we will call the "tradeoff theory,"
compares the relative distortions of an income tax and those of a consumption
tax. A consumption tax does not tax the return to savings. This means that
savings decisions are undistorted, and individuals choose the optimal amount to
consume at each date. A consumption tax does, however, tax labor earnings,
which means that decisions about how much to work are distorted. An income
tax taxes the return to savings, which means that future consumption is
relatively more expensive, and savings decisions will be distorted. The claimed
advantage of an income tax, however, is that, by taxing the returns to savings,
the tax rate on labor earnings can be lower; thus, work decisions are distorted
less under an income tax than they are under a consumption tax. Whether a
consumption tax or an income tax is more efficient depends on the relative
elasticities of savings and work effort. As stated by one prominent economist:
The efficiency effects [of the choice between an income tax and a
consumption tax] depend on assumptions about behavioral effects. If
individuals are relatively unwilling to substitute consumption over time and
relatively willing to substitute leisure for consumption of goods, then a
tax
significant tax on capital income would constitute part of an optimal
10
system. These behavioral effects are difficult to estimate empirically.
This same argument is repeated in the most recently published public finance

9. See supranote 1 for a partial list of papers.
10. GRAVELLE, supra note 2, at 31. Readers will recognize the tradeoff theory as
Ramsey tax theory. Under Ramsey taxation, we should levy a tax on goods with low
elasticity of demand because the quantities consumed are likely to change less when subject
to taxation as compared to goods with high elasticities, thus minimizing deadweight loss.
Moreover, distortion rises with the square of tax rates, which means that the tax base should
be broad; the distortion from the first dollar of tax on one commodity is. very likely to be
smaller than the distortion from the nth dollar of tax on another commodity.
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textbook, which is intended to summarize economists' basic understanding of
these issues. I1
The second reason for supporting an income tax is distributive. Income
taxes are thought to have better distributive consequences than consumption
taxes. One version of this argument is that failure to tax returns to savings
leaves enormous pools of wealth untaxed, creating vast inequalities in our
society. Much of that wealth is created because of general societal conditionssuch as property rights, an effective government, the legal system, educated
workers, natural resources, and protection from invasions-which have nothing
to do with the fortunate (although also skilled and hard-working) individual
that wealth
who earns great wealth as a result. Society has a right to distribute
2
as it sees fit, and it is just and fair to use it to reduce inequality.'
The more technical version of this argument is that transferring a dollar
from the wealthy to the poor increases welfare because the marginal utility of
13
that dollar to a wealthy person is likely to be lower than it is to a poor person.
If utility goes up with income from capital as well as with income from labor,
both should be used as a basis for redistributing. This would seem to be truesomeone with a large trust fund is unlikely to value another dollar as much as
someone working two jobs just to scrape by. Redistributing one dollar from the
trust-fund baby to the working poor is likely to increase overall welfare. Paris
Hilton very likely has a much lower marginal utility of money than someone
slaving in the salt mines sixty hours a week to support his family.
Redistribution from Paris Hilton to the worker makes sense.
The third, often-repeated argument for an income tax is that wealth brings
benefits beyond the value of future consumption. For example, wealth is said to
bring security, prestige, and power. Some have argued that only an income tax
can tax this wealth and corresponding benefits and, therefore, redistribute in
ways that even a highly progressive consumption tax cannot. Given the
importance that these commentators put on redistribution, they conclude that an
income tax is desirable.
AS 1976 shows that a properly designed consumption tax is Pareto
superior to an income tax. It is either more efficient (holding distribution
constant), more redistributive (holding efficiency constant), or both, which

11. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 708 (2005). Gruber
claims that "[g]iven the evidence that labor supply is fairly inelastic ... most economists
think efficiency would rise with a consumption tax that shifts the burden of taxation for
savings to labor. Given the lack of evidence on the response of savings to its after-tax return,
however, such a conclusion is only tentative." Id.
12. See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS (1999); LIAM
MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 101 (2002);
Warren, supra note 1.
13. This may not be true in every case. Some wealthy people may crave additional

wealth more than the poor. But given that we must make some assumption about utility, an
assumption of declining marginal utility of wealth seems to be an unproblematic assumption.
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means that the efficiency and distributive arguments are incorrect. We also
argue that the "wealth as more than future consumption" argument is incorrect,
reserving discussion of this issue for Part V.
14

C. The AS 1976 Argument-Efficiency

The tradeoff theory argues that an income tax might possibly be more
efficient than a consumption tax because it reduces the tax on labor income
while increasing the tax on capital income. Depending on the relevant
elasticities, an income tax might be preferable. AS 1976 shows that the tradeoff
theory is incorrect because it misses one of the effects of a tax on the return to
savings. In particular, a tax on the return to savings, or any nonneutral
commodity tax, has two effects. As widely noted, a tax on the return to savings
distorts savings decisions by reducing the benefit of saving. In addition, it
distorts work effort in exactly the same manner as if the work had been taxed
directly. Thus, the income tax has the same effect on work as a consumption
tax, but it also distorts savings decisions. A tax on savings distorts work effort
for the simple reason that it lowers the payoff from work. Individuals who
work today, planning on consuming in the future, will be able to consume less
in the future for a given hour of work exactly as if their wages were taxed
directly. Thus by ignoring the latter effect, the tradeoff theory gets the
efficiency calculus wrong.
We first illustrate this by using a generic, nonuniform consumption tax and
then by showing how it applies in the case of taxes on the return to savings.
Recall that a uniform tax on consumption is equivalent to a tax on labor
because it reduces the return from working just like a direct tax on labor would.
For example, suppose an individual who earns $100 can spend his earnings on
two goods, prunes and figs, each of which is taxed at a 30% rate when
purchased. This consumption tax is equivalent to a 30% tax directly on labor
income. The individual faces exactly the same set of choices under both
taxes-each hour of labor brings the same ability to purchase the goods. The
individual, therefore, will behave the same way under each tax, and the
efficiency costs-the distortion in work effort (the so-called labor/leisure
distortion)--of the two taxes are the same. Moreover, if the individual behaves
15
the same way, government revenues will be the same under the two regimes.

14. Looking only at efficiency is, in an important sense, contrary to one of the key
points of AS 1976. The authors in AS 1976 argue that Ramsey-type efficiency analysis is
wrong because if we eliminate redistribution from the analysis, the most efficient tax is a
head tax. Once redistribution is added back in, a wage tax best distinguishes among
individuals on the basis of their abilities. AS 1976 never considers the pure efficiency
argument. The discussion in the text treats efficiency separately merely to give the spirit of
the argument before moving on to the more complex case with redistribution.
15. If the individual defers consumption, the government will receive the revenues at a
different point in time, but with the same present value.
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Suppose instead of a uniform 30% tax on figs and prunes, the tax on
prunes was reduced to 20% and the tax on figs increased to 40%. The obvious
effect of such a tax is to distort the choice between prunes and figs. As has long
been noted, a nonuniform tax distorts the choice of which goods to purchase.16
Absent good reasons, we would not want the tax system to tilt the marketdetermined choice between prunes and figs (or among commodities more
generally).
A second, and key, effect of the nonuniform consumption tax is that it
burdens labor just like the uniform tax. Suppose that under the nonuniform tax,
the individual spent $50 on figs (including the tax on figs) and $50 on prunes
(including the tax on prunes). The individual would have $70 of after-tax
consumption. 17 The result is the same as the uniform tax on consumption: his
work effort brings him only $70 of value, as measured by the market, reducing
the return to work exactly as if his labor had been taxed directly. 18 Thus, the
two effects of the nonuniform tax are to distort the choice between prunes and
figs and to distort labor effort exactly as if labor had been taxed at a 30% rate. 19
Suppose we substitute the nonuniform 20%/40% tax on prunes and figs
with a uniform 30% tax. The individual's work effort is taxed in exactly the
same way in the previous two cases. In both cases, the time it takes him to earn
$100 will produce consumption of $70. The efficiency cost with respect to
work-the labor/leisure distortion-is unaffected. The choice between prunes
and figs, however, is improved because relative market prices are preserved.
The nonuniform tax increased the price of figs relative to prunes, and the
uniform tax restores the balance. In particular, under the uniform tax, the
individual can consume the same bundle as before ($30 of figs, $40 of prunes),
but now that the relative prices have changed, he can also adjust his
consumption to better reflect market prices. The uniform tax is strictly more
2
efficient. 0
One way to think of the issue is to "renormalize" the nonuniform 20%/40%
tax as a direct 30% tax on labor income and a 10% subsidy for prunes financed

16. GRAVELLE, supra note 2, at 51.

17. He pays $50 for figs, but this includes a 40% tax on that amount, or $20, leaving
him with $30 of actual figs. He pays $50 for prunes, but this includes $10 of taxes, leaving
him with $40 of actual prunes. Therefore, $30 of figs and $40 of prunes makes $70 total.
18. If the individual spent a different amount on prunes and on figs, the effective tax
rate on labor would be different, but the principle would be the same. Part II.D deals with the
case where individuals with different earnings choose different amounts of commodities.
Part IV deals with the case where individuals with similar earnings choose different amounts
of different commodities.
19. The distortion of the fig/prune choice will reduce the subjective value of the goods
he can purchase through his labor and, in that sense, will reduce the return to labor more
than a 30% wage tax. See infra note 22.
20. Note also that the uniform tax raises the same revenue as the 20%/40% tax, $30, so
the government is indifferent.
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by a 10% tax on figs. 2 1 The overall tax on figs would be the 30% tax on labor
and the 10% direct tax on figs, or 40%. Similarly, the overall tax on prunes
would be the 30% tax on labor less the 10% subsidy for prunes, or 20%.
Formulated this way, we can see directly both effects of the nonuniform tax. It
distorts labor effort just like a direct tax on labor; in addition, it distorts the
choice of which commodities to consume, here subsidizing prunes and
penalizing figs. Unless there is some reason for subsidizing prunes and
penalizing figs, we would not want to have the nonuniform tax.
The use of prunes and figs is intended to hint at consumption in the present
and in the future. To see the connection, recall that we can view an income tax
as a nonneutral commodity tax because it imposes higher rates on future
consumption than on present consumption. It is just like the 20%/40% tax on
prunes and figs. The tax on future consumption (figs) reduces the return to
labor because the individual knows that each hour of effort produces fewer
goods at the future date. The tradeoff theory misses the effect of the tax on the
return to savings on labor effort. Moreover, the tax on the return to savings is
less efficient than a pure labor tax because, in addition to raising revenue, it
distorts savings decisions. The result does not depend at all on the relative
elasticity of savings and labor. A wage tax is more
efficient even if labor
22
income is highly elastic and savings highly inelastic.
To illustrate, suppose that an individual plans to save half of his earnings
for retirement in twenty-five years, that the rate of return on his savings is 5%,
and that he is subject to a 20% income tax. As noted, we can think of this
income tax as a uniform tax on all consumption plus an additional tax on future
consumption due to the tax on investment returns. Under these numbers
(picked to match the prune/fig example), the tax on present consumption is
20%. Future consumption is taxed more heavily because the rate of return on
investments is reduced from the pretax 5% to the after-tax 4%. If we treat the
reduction in year-25 consumption as an additional tax on that consumption, the
rate would be roughly 20%. The total tax on future consumption would then

21.

Kaplow, Undesirabilityof Commodity Taxation, supra note 4, introduces this type

of renormalization in his extension of AS 1976.
22. Said another way, to have any force, the tradeoff theory has to assume that the tax
on figs or on future consumption does not affect labor effort but only affects the choice
between figs and prunes, future and present. Although the effect on labor effort is relatively
easy to miss, once it has been pointed out, it is hard to see a justification for such an
assumption. Perhaps one can offer various psychological theories for why people
misperceive the effect of various taxes, but the tradeoff theory purports to apply standard
economics, and such an assumption is entirely unjustified within standard economics. A tax
on future consumption reduces the value of work today and, therefore, has the same
distorting effect as a direct tax on that work.
23. Calculated as follows: Suppose the individual invests $100 at the pretax rate of
interest of 5% for twenty-five years. He would have $339 to consume. The tax on the
interest reduces the return to 4% and the amount available at retirement to $267. The
reduction in retirement consumption is the difference, or $72. Translating this to the present,
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be 40%, matching the prune/fig example.
The individual would face the same choices as the individual in the
prune/fig example. His choice of when to consume, like the choice between
prunes or figs, would be distorted by the nonuniform tax. Moreover, his return
to work would be reduced both by the 20% tax on all consumption, during
whatever period, and by the additional tax on any future consumption.
Continuing with the same numbers as the prune/fig example, suppose that,
facing these rates, he invested half his earnings for consumption in the future
and spent the other half in the present. For each hour he works, he would know
that the overall tax rate was a blend of the tax rate on immediate consumption
and the tax on future consumption. Overall, his labor would face a tax rate of
30%, and he would adjust his work effort accordingly. We can, like in the
prune/fig case, think of the tax as a 30% tax on all consumption (or labor) and a
10% subsidy for present consumption financed by a 10% tax on future
consumption.
Suppose we replace the 20% income tax with a 30% consumption or wage
tax. The individual will face the same tax on labor. The time it takes to earn
$100 will, in both cases, bring $70 of consumption (in present value terms).
With the 30% consumption tax, however, there is no tax distorting the choice
between consuming today and consuming in the future. This choice, therefore,
can be made more efficiently. The 30% consumption or wage tax is strictly
more efficient than the 20% income tax. There is no tradeoff.
At the risk of belaboring the issue, we want to extend the prune/fig
example by explicitly adding wage income and a wage tax. We do so both to
further illustrate the efficiency arguments made here and to set the stage for
considering redistribution in the next Part. We use prunes and figs rather than
present and future merely to avoid the complexities of present value
calculations.
Consider a person (whom we will call "Middle" in the next Part when we
consider redistribution) who has wage income of $50,000 and spends it on two
goods, prunes and figs. Suppose we have a wage tax of 50% and a tax on figs
of 50% but no separate tax on prunes. Given these taxes, Middle has $25,000
remaining after paying wage taxes to spend on prunes and figs. Suppose
Middle spends $20,000 on prunes and $5000 on figs (consisting of $2500 on
figs and $2500 in taxes on the figs). 24 Of the $50,000 earned, he pays $27,500
in taxes and gets $22,500 in consumption in return for the labor effort. We may
assume that the tax has also distorted Middle's choice of whether to eat figs or
it is equivalent to imposing an immediate tax on retirement savings of $21 but allowing the
savings to grow tax-free.
24. We are assuming that the tax on figs is 50% of the total amount paid, including
taxes. Alternatively, the tax could be stated on a tax-exclusive basis, in which case it would
mean that Middle spends $3333 on figs and pays taxes of $1667. It doesn't matter which
method is used, as long as the numbers are all done consistently through the remainder of the
example.
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prunes; while he still eats figs, he eats fewer figs than he would if they were not
subject to the additional tax.
The technique used above was to find a tax, which we will call the
replicating tax, that falls only on labor income or consumption and that
provides the government the same revenue as the nonneutral tax. In our
example, Middle pays $27,500 in taxes and gets $22,500 in consumption. The
replicating tax would be a tax of $27,500 on wages of $50,000, or a 55% tax.
Middle will now have $22,500 left after paying the wage tax and will have the
same amount available for consumption as before. However, Middle will be
better off because the choice between prunes and figs is no longer distorted by
taxes. The replicating tax, therefore, is a Pareto improvement over
the 50%
25
wage/fig tax-Middle is better off, and the fisc is equally well off.
The key fact missed by the tradeoff theory is that the tax on figs reduces

25. We use prunes and figs rather than present/future in the text because examples
using present value calculations tend to be numerically complex. The same principles apply
in the present/future context. To illustrate, suppose that in year 1, taxpayer T receives wages
of $50,000 when the income tax rate is 50%. He pays $25,000 in wage taxes, consumes
$12,500 and invests $12,500 at 10% to produce $13,781 in after-tax consumption in year 2.
The Treasury receives $25,000 in year 1 and $1344 in year 2, or $25,595.24 in year 1
present value.
Now assume that (1) the tax on interest income is eliminated, (2) the tax rate on wages
is increased to 51.1367%, and (3) amounts saved in year 1 are subject to a tax of 2.3% while
amounts spent on consumption get a subsidy at the same rate. T and the Treasury can
achieve exactly the same results as under the income tax.
In year 1, T pays wage taxes of $25,568.18 (0.51136 x $50,000), and divides his aftertax wages of $24,431.82 equally between spending and saving. The savings of $12,215.91
are reduced by a tax of $284.09 (0.023 x the saved amount), which is used to subsidize the
spending, so T has after-tax year-i consumption of $12,500 ($12,215.91 + $284.09). Ts
year-I after-tax savings of$11,931.82 ($12,215.91 - $284.09) produces year-2 consumption
of $13,125.00 ($11,931.82 x 1.1).
's responses to the income tax and the reconstructed tax should be identical because
the opportunities are identical under the two systems. Therefore, the distortion of his choice
between labor and leisure under both taxes must be due to an effective tax rate of 51.136%
on wages, not the nominal rate of 50% under the income tax. 's choice between savings and
spending is also identically distorted under the two taxes. Elimination of the second
distortion by adopting an explicit wage tax of 51.1367% (without the tax on savings and
subsidy for spending) must, therefore, be more efficient because it eliminates the second
distortion without increasing the first. When substituting a wage tax for an income tax, there
is no additional distortion caused by the higher wage tax rate, so the efficiency gains from
eliminating interest taxation do not have to be weighed against any efficiency losses from
increasing wage taxation. We thank Al Warren for this example.
There is an important and subtle difference between the adjustments to the tax schedule
described here and that found in much of the literature, such as those by Kaplow, supra note
4. Kaplow's approach is to adjust the wage tax to hold utility constant and show that this
raises more revenue than the alternative, nonneutral tax. We adjust the wage tax to keep
revenue rather than utility constant. Our adjustment is based entirely on an observable
variable-the revenue raised at each wage level under the commodity tax. By basing the
adjustment on an observable variable, however, we give up flexibility in how the Pareto
improvements are distributed.
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Middle's labor effort. Assuming he wants to eat some figs,2 6 Middle will know
that each hour of work will produce fewer figs than it had without the tax.
Work is correspondingly less rewarding to Middle, just as if it were taxed
directly. Moreover, the tax on figs is an inefficient tax on labor because in
addition to paying the explicit tax, Middle will suffer an additional decline in
welfare to the extent the tax has led him to substitute prunes for his preferred
good, figs. Replacing the tax on figs with a small increase in wage tax will
eliminate this latter form of welfare loss. This result will hold any time the tax
causes Middle to substitute prunes for figs. He will pay an explicit tax and
suffer an additional decline in welfare due the substitution away from his
preferred good. The pure wage tax will always eliminate this latter form of
welfare loss. We do not have to know anything about the so-called Ramsey
factors-the relative elasticities of figs or prunes-to know that
the replicating
27
tax, a pure wage tax, is more efficient than the nonneutral tax.
The argument applies equally to present and future consumption. An
income tax is like the tax on figs. It imposes an additional tax on future
consumption that both burdens labor and distorts the decision of when to
consume. A replicating tax is strictly more efficient.
Note that the argument does not depend on the usual arguments for taxing
consumption. For example, the argument does not depend on what one thinks
about the alleged unfairness of taxing income twice, once when it is earned and
once when it is invested and earns interest. 28 The number of times an item is
taxed is irrelevant. (Ten taxes at 1% should equal one tax at 10%.) Similarly,
the argument does not rely on common-pool reasoning 29 or equal-sacrifice
ideas. 30 It also does not require us to view interest income as compensation for
the pain of deferring consumption. 3 1 Instead, we need merely to view the
interest rate as setting the price of goods to be consumed in the future and a tax
on interest income as increasing that price. Given that a person saves (other
than with respect to his last, marginal dollar of savings), he very much likes
that price and is better off for taking it. Therefore, he is more than compensated
by interest for the pain of deferring consumption. This fact, however, is entirely
irrelevant, just as it is irrelevant that he likes the price of prunes and is better
26. If Middle never consumes any figs, the tax on figs is a nullity.
27. There are two (unrealistic) assumptions under which the replicating wage tax will
merely be equally efficient but not strictly more efficient. First, if Middle is completely
indifferent between prunes and figs he can costlessly avoid the tax on figs by giving up figs.
The tax will not be inefficient-but it will raise no revenue. Second, if Middle's demand for
figs is completely inelastic and so he consumes as many figs as before, the tax is as efficient
as a wage tax because it does not impose an additional welfare loss by causing Middle to
give up a preferred good.
28. See generally MILL, supra note 1.
29. See generally HOBBES, supra note I.
30. See generally BRADFORD, supra note 1.
31. See Alan Gunn, The Casefor an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 370 (1979); Mark
Kelman, Time Preference and Tax Equity, 35 STAN. L. REV. 649 (1973).

HeinOnline -- 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1427 2005-2006

1428

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1413

off for buying prunes at their going price and just as it is irrelevant that a tax on
labor ignores the fact that wages compensate individuals for the costs of work.
D. The AS 1976 Argument-Redistribution

We can now add redistribution to the analysis. The argument is
straightforward given the efficiency analysis above. The efficiency analysis
considered a single individual and showed that we can replace a nonneutral tax
(such as a tax on savings) with a consumption or wage tax (the replicating tax)
to make that individual better off. To add distribution to the analysis, we
simply perform this same substitution of tax systems at each income level.
Following the same argument, individuals at each income level would be better
off. The replicating tax, therefore, is a Pareto improvement over an income tax,
even when redistribution is taken into account. A wage or consumption tax,
properly structured, is thus preferable to an income tax, and this holds entirely
without regard to our views on how much redistribution is appropriate.
We can analogize the argument for a tax on savings to the argument for a
luxury tax. The argument for a luxury tax is that only the rich can afford to
purchase luxuries. A tax on luxuries, therefore, seems to have good distributive
properties that might outweigh any inefficiencies. Notwithstanding the possible
distributive properties, however, a luxury tax is not desirable. For each income
class, we can determine its luxury purchases and replace the luxury tax with the
replicating wage tax. For example, suppose that those who earn between
$30,000 and $50,000, $50,000 and $100,000, $100,000 and $200,000, and so
forth tend to purchase luxuries with a given percentage of their earnings that
increases as incomes increase. As illustrated above, we can adjust the tax on
their labor earnings to replicate the effect of the luxury tax. With such an
adjustment, each income class will pay the same total tax. Distribution,
therefore, is held constant, but the overall system is more efficient. Indeed, the
efficiency gains can be traded off for more redistribution, if so desired. If the
gains from eliminating the luxury tax are used to create more redistribution, the
more one favors redistribution, the more one should be against a luxury tax.
The identical argument applies to a tax on the return to savings. The
argument for a tax on the return to savings is that the rich save more than the
poor, so savings is like a luxury good. On the surface, taxing savings seems to
have good distributive properties, but for the same reason the luxury tax is
undesirable, a tax on savings is also undesirable.
To fill thisin, we expand the example used in the prior Part. Suppose there
are three types of individuals in society: Poor, Middle, and Rich, with Middle
the same as the individual described in Part I.C. They consume two types of
commodities: figs and prunes. Rich consumes more figs and fewer prunes
(relative to his total) than does Middle, who similarly consumes more figs and
fewer prunes than Poor.
Suppose again that we have a flat-rate wage tax of 50%, a 50% tax on figs,
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and no tax on prunes. The tax on figs but not prunes is justified on the theory
that Rich consumes relatively more figs, so such a tax is progressive. We use a
flat-rate wage tax here for illustration, but the wage tax could have any
structure, and the argument would still work.3 2 Suppose that given these taxes,
incomes and consumption amounts are as follows:
Table 1. Effect of 50% Flat-Rate Wage Tax and 50% Fig Tax on Poor, Middle,
and Rich Taxpayers
Poor

Middle

Rich

Pretax wage income

$25,000

$50,000

$100,000

Wage taxes (50% rate)

$12,500

$25,000

$50,000

After-tax wages

$12,500

$25,000

$50,000

Prune consumption

$12,500

$20,000

$25,000

Fig consumption (including tax)

$0

$5000

$25,000

Fig tax (50% rate)

$0

$2500

$12,500

$12,500

$27,500

$62,500

50%

55%

63%

Total taxes paid
Taxes as a percent of wages

In the argument on efficiency above, we replaced Middle's wage/fig
combination tax with a wage tax that produced the same total taxes. We make
the same adjustment here except that we do so for each type of individual
separately. Therefore, we eliminate the combination wage/fig tax and replace it
with a new, more progressive wage tax with rates of 50% on Poor, 55% on
Middle, and 62.5% on Rich. This tax is a Pareto improvement over the
wage/fig combination tax.
As in the case with only one individual, both Middle and Rich are better
off under the new structure. (Poor is neutral rather than better off because he
did not consume figs.) Given the tax on figs and not prunes, Middle and Rich
presumably reduced their fig consumption to an amount lower than they desire.
The new tax structure gets rid of this distortion, allowing them to make better
consumption decisions (more figs, fewer prunes). While eliminating the
prune/fig distortion, the replicating tax holds redistribution constant: each
individual pays the same tax under the replicating tax as in the wage/fig tax
structure. Therefore, the replicating tax is Pareto superior.
Now, as before, translate prunes into present consumption and figs into
future consumption (savings). The fig tax becomes the tax on interest income.
The argument that the tax on interest income is undesirable is identical to the
argument that the tax on figs is undesirable. The tax on interest income may

32. The works by Kaplow, supra note 4, demonstrate this formally.
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redistribute from the rich to the poor, but we can achieve equal redistribution
through a more progressive tax on labor income that does not distort savings
decisions. Everyone would be at least as well or better off.
Note that the argument does not depend on the relative degree of inequality
in our society or our preferences for redistribution. Therefore, the recent
increases in inequality have no bearing on the choice between an income tax
and a consumption tax. Similarly, one's views on the appropriate extent of
redistribution have no effect on the argument. Even if we believe in substantial
redistribution, a consumption tax remains superior. In fact, as indicated above
with respect to a luxury tax, the more we prefer redistribution the more we
might want a consumption tax because the Pareto advantages can be used to
redistribute more rather than to increase efficiency.
The analysis so far has considered only the simplest case. The return to
investing was assumed to be risk-free. We have ignored the significant returns
to risk-taking and the potential for economic profits (i.e., profits that are above
and beyond normal returns to investing). Moreover, we have assumed that
there are no inheritances or other ways that individuals can have high
consumption but little or no labor. A replicating tax on labor would seem to
require that there be labor earnings to tax. We have also assumed that
individuals within each class-poor, middle, and rich-save the same amount
(or consume the same number of figs). Individuals with the same earnings,
however, save different amounts. Eliminating the tax on savings and replacing
it with a higher tax on earnings will benefit individuals at a given level of
earnings who save a lot at the expense of individuals who earn the same
amount but save less. Depending on our views about this type of redistribution,
we might support an income tax. We might, for example, believe that an
individual with the same earnings as others but higher wealth (because he
saved more) is better off and should be taxed at a higher rate. This might be
because wealth (consumption in the future) brings more utility than early
consumption. It might alternatively be because wealth brings benefits
independent of consumption. 33 We consider each of these complications below.

33. Another possibility that we suspect is in the back (or front) of the minds of many
supporters of an income tax is that a consumption tax would, in reality, not end up being as
progressive as an income tax. See Kelman, supra note 31, at 679. We are not sure why this
would be true. If we were going to consider political outcomes, we would also have to
consider the long-term reluctance of the political branches to fully tax capital income under
an income tax regime. In any event, this consideration seems irrelevant to the comparison of
ideal income and consumption taxes.
A related issue is whether it is feasible to design sufficiently progressive consumption
taxes to replace income taxes. The design of tax systems is beyond the scope of this Article,
which merely considers ideal tax systems. We do not, however, believe that these design
issues are significant. See David Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAx L. REv. 1
(2005), for a discussion comparing the design of income and consumption taxes.
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II. RISK AND PROFITS

So far, the analysis has considered only the risk-free return to investing.
Much of the return to investing, however, may be due to risk-taking and to
super-normal returns or economic profits. If income taxes capture these returns
and consumption taxes do not, there may be reasons for taxing income that are
separate from the considerations discussed above. For example, income taxes
might conceivably be more fair than consumption taxes by taxing those lucky
enough to win when making risky investments.
The standard result in the literature, however, is that flat-rate, ideal income
and consumption taxes differ only by the taxation of the risk-free rate of return,
even in the presence of risk and profits. 34 In particular, neither tax taxes the
returns to risk-bearing, and both taxes tax profits. If this is the case, the
conclusions above hold without modification once we add risk and profits.
Income taxes offer no additional fairness or efficiency benefits over
consumption taxes by taxing risky returns or profits. That is, even with risk and
profits, the only difference between income and consumption taxes is the riskfree rate of return, and all of the examples above apply directly.
We refer interested readers to the many sources on the treatment of risk
and profits in ideal income and consumption taxes and do not repeat the
arguments in detail here. 35 Because it is necessary to our discussion of
graduated rates on capital income immediately below, however, we illustrate
the arguments briefly. Suppose that a taxpayer makes a bet with a 50% chance
of winning $100 and a 50% chance of losing $100. If, under an income tax,
winnings and losses are both taxed at a 30% rate (losses being deducted at that
rate), the bet is reduced from a $100 bet to a $70 bet. If the taxpayer wins $100,
he keeps $70 after paying taxes. If he loses $100, he gets the benefit of the
$100 deduction, reducing his after-tax losses to $70. The taxpayer, however,
can increase the size of the bet so that the bet will be worth $100 after taxes. In
particular, if the taxpayer increases the size of his bet by 1/(l-t), where t is the
tax rate, he restores his pretax position. With our numbers, the taxpayer makes
a $143 bet, which produces winnings and losses of $100 after taxes. 36 In our
existing and very complicated tax system, individuals may not be able to do
this because of rules such as loss limitations and the like, but in an ideal income
tax, the argument is straightforward, and here we are comparing ideal systems.
This analysis does not necessarily hold if investments are taxed at
increasing marginal rates, and it is this issue which we focus on now. The ideal

34. Warren, supra note 1.
35. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax
and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does It Matter?, 47 TAx L. REv. 377 (1992);
Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking, A General Equilibrium Perspective, 47 NAT'L
TAx J. 789 (1994); Warren, supra note 1; Weisbach, supra note 33.
36. The same holds true for investments (as opposed to the pure bet illustrated above)
with risky returns. Individuals can increase their investments by 1/(l-t) by borrowing.
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income tax base does not require any particular rate structure: it may be either
graduated or flat. The same is true with respect to the ideal consumption tax
base. As noted, the two taxes differ in their treatment of investment income,
and our comparisons thus far have assumed that under an income tax,
investment income is taxed at a flat rate. The tax on investment income
disproportionately burdens high wage earners not because that income itself is
taxed at a progressive rate but because high wage earners save more and have
more of that income. The assumption that the income tax on investment income
is flat is supported by many provisions of current law, but it is obviously
contradicted by other provisions. 37 An alternative assumption is that under an
income tax, investment income should be taxed under a graduated rate
structure. In that case, as investment income grows, the rate at which it is taxed
increases.
There is very little, if any, literature analyzing the effects of taxing capital
income by using graduated rates. The literature on optimal progressivity
analyzes only wage taxes. 38 Arguments in favor of an income tax because of
the distributive effect of taxing capital income are not explicit about the rate
structure to be imposed on capital income and usually discuss progressivity
arising solely because of the fact of taxing capital income. 39 Given the lack of
prior analysis of the issue and the complexity of the problem, we limit
ourselves to two points. First, we argue that the issue is orthogonal to the
choice between income and consumption taxes because both types of taxes can
equally impose graduated rates on the returns to risk-taking and profits.
Second, we will offer some preliminary analysis of the effects of imposing
graduated rates on capital income and conclude that it is unlikely to be
desirable. Our views on the second point are preliminary, but the first point
alone should be sufficient for purposes of this Article.
To see that the issue is unrelated to the choice between income and
consumption taxes, consider first the treatment of the riskless return under a
rate structure with increasing marginal rates. The total tax on investment
income is now comprised of a pure time-value-of-money tax and a

37. The current rate structure is progressive, on capital as well as other sources of

income, so that, over certain ranges, additional income is taxed at higher rates. On the other
hand, many individuals are already at the maximum rates and thus face a flat rate on
investment income; this is particularly true with respect to investments that produce dividend
income and capital gains, where the maximum rate is reached at relatively low levels of
income. Many corporate investors are also in the maximum rate with respect to investments.
38. See J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38

REv. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971). Moreover, the problem of graduated rates on capital income
is distinct from that with respect to labor income, so we cannot apply intuitions from that
literature to capital income. The optimal labor income tax problem centers on creating taxes
that cause individuals to reveal their true wage rates. The problem is one of mechanism
design. The problem of the optimal rate structure on capital income can be seen as an
insurance problem, reducing the harms of losing risky bets.
39. See, e.g., GRAVELLE, supra note 2; GRUBER, supra note 11.
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supplemental tax due to the rate increase. The result is a higher and more
inefficient tax on capital income, as can be seen using the same replicating tax
argument made above.
For example, a wage earner in the 50% bracket who realizes $50 of interest
income on a $1000 investment finds her return reduced to $25. If the
investment income is taxed under a progressive rate structure that pushes the
individual to a 60% bracket, the return is reduced to $20. A replicating
consumption tax can achieve the same distributional effect without reducing
the return to capital. Therefore, as in the main case in the previous Part,
replacing the income tax with one of these taxes will increase welfare without
affecting the distribution of the tax burden among different wage or
consumption classes. Indeed, since the tax on capital has now risen, the relative
desirability of those forms of consumption tax increases.
The only possible argument, therefore, for a graduated tax on capital
income is with respect to risky returns. Both income and consumption taxes,
however, can use graduated taxes on risky returns. To see this, we have to
examine in more detail the methods of implementing income and consumption
taxes. Start with a flat-rate "cash flow" tax. Consumption in a period is equal to
net receipts for the period less any amount saved-it is income minus net
savings. This means that a cash flow system is a consumption tax. That is, the
difference between an income tax and a consumption tax can be thought of as
the method of basis recovery. In an income tax, an investment gets a basis that
is offset against received income. In a cash flow system, the investment is
deducted right away. The difference-that is, recovering the cost of an
investment over time (through a basis account) versus recovering the cost right
away-is merely the time-value-of-money difference. We can alternatively
implement a consumption tax by giving taxpayers basis with the same present
value as an immediate deduction. In particular, we can, like in an income tax,
give taxpayers basis but then increase it in each period to reflect the time value
of money.
Suppose now that we impose graduated marginal rates in an income tax.
We can impose the same graduation in the consumption tax just described,
where taxpayers get basis that is increased in each period by the time value of
money. The two systems will impose identical taxes on risky retums-the only
difference between the systems would be the increase in basis in the
consumption tax for the time value of money. 40 If a graduated tax on risky
returns is desirable, it can be achieved under either system.
Although our analysis is still preliminary, 4 1 it seems unlikely that

40. The idea of a consumption tax with graduated marginal rates on risky returns is not
new. For example, Edward McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV.
807 (2005), advocates for a consumption tax of this sort.
41. Our analysis does not, for example, consider revenue constraints and general
equilibrium effects. A more complete analysis likely would be based on the optimal
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graduated taxes on risky returns would be desirable. The motivation for such a
rate structure is that risky outcomes are a matter of luck rather than effort, and
it is appropriate to reduce or eliminate differences in outcomes due purely to
good or bad luck.42
An analysis of whether or how to reduce differences in lucky outcomes
must begin by asking why we have these differences. If individuals are
optimally diversified, there should be no such differences-everyone would
have the same portfolio. Individuals may not be fully diversified for a variety
of reasons. They might, for example, hold a concentrated ownership in a small
business that they cannot sell at a fair price because of a lemons market or
adverse selection problem. Alternatively, they might hold a concentrated
ownership in a business because of moral hazard problems-that is, it might be
efficient to hold a concentrated position to improve incentives. If the problem
is adverse selection, government-provided reduction in risk might be optimal,
but if the problem is moral hazard, it would not. Other individuals might not be
diversified because of transactions costs, in which case we might ask whether
the additional risk reduction provided through the tax system has lower
transactions costs than the additional risk reduction available in the market.
Suppose that we conclude that, on balance, it is desirable to reduce
differences in outcomes due to luck. It is not clear, in such a case, that
increasing graduated rates would be desirable. Consider as a baseline the case
where there are no behavioral responses to the tax system; therefore, we want
to entirely eliminate differences due solely to luck. To have a concrete
example, suppose two identical individuals each have $100 which they bet on a
risky investment. Suppose that the investment will pay either $120 or $90 with
equal probability. To keep the example simple, suppose that the payoff is
instantaneous.
To eliminate differences in outcomes, we would give each individual the
expected value of the bet, or $105. The tax structure that would achieve this
outcome has decreasing marginal rates. The loser would have to be able to
deduct his loss at a rate of 150%, and the winner would pay taxes on his gains
at a rate of 75%.43 The
intuition for this result is that if one loses money, higher
44
tax rates are better.
insurance contract literature because the social goal in this case would be very much like the
goals of private insurance contracts.
42. See generally AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970);
Peter Diamond, Cardinal Welfare, IndividualisticEthics, and InterpersonalComparison of
Utility: Comment, 75 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1967); John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare,
IndividualisticEthics, andInterpersonalComparisonof Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955).

43. An alternative rate structure that gives the same result would be a 100% tax on all
returns and a demogrant of $15 to each individual. This, however, is a flat structure, not an
increasing marginal rate structure.
44. Consider loss limitations. They create increasing marginal rates because losers,
facing disallowance of loss deductions, effectively face a marginal rate of zero. Winners face
a positive marginal rate. Loss restrictions are thought to hurt losers, illustrating that high
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The analysis is more complex once we allow behavioral changes and,
therefore, must consider efficiency effects. Complete elimination of differences
in this case is unlikely to be optimal because it would affect incentives to take
risk. Moreover, portfolio shifts in response to the tax on risk can have
counterintuitive effects.
Consider the same bet, a $100 bet that pays either $120 or $90, and
suppose that we are considering imposing three different rate structures: a flat
50% rate, increasing marginal rates of 40% and 60%, or decreasing marginal
rates of 60% and 40%. We know that with a flat-rate structure of 50% we can
think of individuals as borrowing and doubling their bets to $200. After paying
taxes and paying back the loan, they will be left in the same position they
would have been in if there were no tax, having either $90 or $120. A flat-rate
structure does not reduce differences in outcomes due to risk.
Suppose we impose increasing marginal rates. Individuals making the bet
will not know the rate at which the payoff will be taxed, so they will not know
how to adjust their portfolios. There are any number of possibilities, but
consider three. First, they may adjust their portfolios using the tax rate on
losses, or 40%. Winners would find that they had not increased their bets
enough to offset the 60% tax on their winnings and would be left with only
$113 after all is said and done. 45 Losers would have correctly adjusted their
portfolios and would be left with $90. In this case, the tax has reduced the
difference in outcomes.
Second, they may adjust their portfolios based on the gain rate, or 60%.
Winners, in this case, would have made the correct adjustment and would be
left with $120. Losers, however, would have adjusted their portfolios counting
on deducting losses at 60% but would only be able to deduct them at the 40%
rate. Having increased the size of a losing bet and then being unable to deduct
the loss at the higher tax rate, they would be worse off than without taxes,
ending up with only $85.46 Increasing marginal rates in this case would
increase differences in outcomes, the opposite of the desired effect.
Finally, they may adjust somewhere in the middle, say at 50%. In this case,
winners end up with only $116, worse off by $4. Losers, however, also end up
worse off than they would without taxes, losing $2 and ending up with $88. A
flat-rate-structure Pareto dominates this case. Note, however, that the various
cases leave the government with a different amount of money ($7 in the case of
adjustments to a 60% rate, $5 for a 40% rate, and $6 for a 50% rate). To make
them comparable, we would have to adjust the rate structure or refund some of
rather than low marginal rates on those who lose bets may be more desirable.
45. They increase their bet by 1/(l-t) or 166.67% in our case. If they win, the $166.67
turns into $200. They have gains of $33.33 and must pay taxes of $20. After paying taxes
and paying back $66.67, they are left with $113.
46. They increase their bets to $250. They lose money, ending up with only $225.
Having lost $25 on their bets, they deduct it and get a tax benefit of 40% of that loss, or $10.
After paying back $150, they are left with $85.
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the tax revenue. Nevertheless, the analysis gives a basic indication of the likely
directions of the effects.
The result is the opposite with decreasing marginal rates. If they adjust to
the gain rate, there is a reduction in the difference in outcomes; if they adjust to
to the average, both are better
the loss rate, there is an increase. If they adjust
47
loser.
the
than
more
gains
winner
off, but the
These initial results do not support increasing marginal rates on capital
income. There will be clear efficiency losses, but the distributive gains are
uncertain. The exact nature of the distributive gains (or possibly losses) from
increasing marginal rates depend on portfolio adjustments that are the product
of factors that are difficult to predict.
III. WEALTH WITHOUT LABOR INCOME

An important motivation for an income tax is to tax the idle rich. An
income tax is thought to tax their wealth in ways that a consumption tax
cannot. To translate this to our argument, we show that the distributive effects
of an income tax can be replicated with a tax on labor income. The procedure
we used above was to increase the tax on labor income by the amount each
individual bears of the tax on the commodity. To make this adjustment in the
manner demonstrated, individuals must have labor income to be taxed. The idle
rich, however, appear to have little or no labor income, making the envisioned
adjustment problematic. For a wealthy retiree, or a trust-fund baby, eliminating
the tax on savings and replacing it with a more progressive wage tax would
seem to be manna from heaven. Both benefit from the elimination of tax on
investment income, and neither have significant amounts of wage income.
Similarly, Bill Gates pays himself a very small salary. Instead, he takes most of
his earnings as capital gains on the sale of Microsoft stock. There is no
adjustment to the wage tax that would offset the benefits to Gates of
eliminating the tax on capital. We will argue that these sorts of examples are
misleading and that the intuition behind the examples is wrong. If the
consumption/wage tax is properly structured and understood, these examples
pose no problems for the AS 1976 analysis.
The solution lies in the distinction between a wage tax and a consumption
tax. So far we have been treating them as identical and have usually used the
term "wage tax" for both. As noted, however, there are important differences
between the two, and the problems highlighted above are problems with wage
taxes, not consumption taxes. By using a properly structured "replicating
consumption tax," we can eliminate the problems of apparent wealth without
labor income.
47. The numbers are as follows: If they adjust to the gain rate, the outcome is
$120/$93. If they adjust to the loss rate, the outcome is $130/$90. If they adjust to the
average, the outcome is $124/$92.
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To see the difference, compare a flat-rate wage tax and a flat-rate retail
sales tax on all goods and services (a consumption tax). The wage tax is
imposed when wages are earned. There is no further tax down the road when
the earnings are used to purchase goods. A retail sales tax is not imposed when
wages are earned. Instead, sales taxes are imposed only when the individual
purchases consumption goods, often many years after the wages are earned.
One might say loosely that a wage tax is ex ante while a retail sales tax is ex
post. In fact, most consumption taxes are largely ex post-they are imposed
when consumption goods are purchased.
Consider the individual who has substantial labor income that is incorrectly
labeled as capital income. This is the Bill Gates problem. He did not make a
big investment in Microsoft stock. Instead, most of his net worth comes from
his labor. Nevertheless, most of his income appears to come from capital-in
the form of dividends or stock sales. A wage tax will not pick up this income.
An ex post consumption tax, however, will tax this income to the extent it is
really attributable to his labor. A consumption tax ignores the labels put on
earnings because the tax is not imposed directly on earnings. Instead, the tax is
imposed when the earnings are spent, and the source of the earnings is
irrelevant. Therefore, to the extent that Gates's stock value reflects his labor
income, it is taxed under a properly structured consumption tax.4 8 The hidden
labor problem can readily be solved.
The wealthy retiree problem can also be solved with an ex post
consumption tax. She benefits from the elimination of tax on capital, but we
cannot go back and levy a more progressive tax on her wages. Under an ex post
consumption tax, we tax her consumption when it occurs.
The retiree problem is really one of transition to a consumption tax. Had a
consumption tax been imposed all along, there would be no issue. Either the
retiree would have paid a progressive wage tax when she earned the money, or
she would not have paid any tax on wages that were used to fund deferred
consumption until the time of that consumption. The retiree problem comes
about because the retirees earned and saved under an income tax. There is a
large literature discussing this transition issue. Instead of reviewing that
literature, we make three points.
First, the comparison between the ideal forms of an income tax and a
consumption tax should be made as if each had always been in place. The goal
is to find out which system is more desirable. If we assume that one system or
the other is already in place, it biases the argument toward the status quo
because transition in either direction (from income to consumption or
consumption to income) is likely to be difficult. Rather than assume a status
quo, we should instead determine which base is preferable if we were writing

48. One way to conceptualize this example is that under a cash flow consumption tax,
Gates gets no deduction for his labor effort, so to the extent gains on his stock are due to
labor effort, there was no earlier deduction for the investment that offsets that tax on the sale.
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from a blank slate. 49 If it turns out one base is preferable but we currently use
the other, we can then determine whether the transition costs are worth the
benefit. The first task, however, is to determine which base is preferable. Said
another way, it is quite a different thing to believe that an income tax is
desirable than to believe that a consumption tax is desirable but hindered by a
serious transition problem. Research agendas would shift from determining
how to perfect the income tax to how to transition out of it.
Second, it is not clear that the presence of retiree wealth makes a transition
to a consumption tax more or less desirable. Consider, for example, the
adoption of an ex post consumption tax such as a retail sales tax. Because
retirees have already been taxed on the wages and investment income that
produced their current wealth, it might seem unfair to tax that wealth when it is
consumed. On the other hand, taxation of retiree consumption might produce
50
efficiency gains that could be used to fund lower overall rates for everyone.
Finally, the transition problem is not inherent to the choice between a
consumption tax and a wage tax. Instead, it5 1is one of the effects of switching
between different methods of collecting tax.
The case of the trust-fund baby is roughly parallel to that of the retiree.
Under an ex post consumption tax, we can get at her wealth when it is
consumed. Fundamentally, though, the problem is one of transition. Had a
progressive wage tax been in place when the money used to fund the trust was
earned, her donor would have had less to invest, and the trust-fund baby would
have less to spend now. In that event, the tax due from her trust would have
been "prepaid" by the donor. 52 Alternatively, had an ex post consumption tax
been in place when the money was earned, the donor would not have been
taxed on the wages that were used to fund the trust, and the income from the
investment would be taxed at the time of consumption.

49. In fact, it would be a bad idea, even if we were to assume a status quo, to assume
that it is the income tax. Although the federal government currently relies to some extent on
a version of an income tax, it also relies significantly on a wage tax. Moreover, other
governments, state and foreign, rely heavily on consumption taxes. An answer that income
taxes are more desirable would raise the issue of transition from a consumption tax to an
income tax regardless.
50. The efficiency gains would come about because the retirees had already worked
and saved, and, therefore, an extra level of tax on their wealth would not distort their
behavior. However, some or all (or more than all) of these gains might be lost if the
imposition of the extra tax caused taxpayers in the future to worry that the government might
impose an extra tax on their work effort as well. There might be additional efficiency losses
if the extra tax was anticipated because holders of soon-to-be-taxed wealth could avoid the
tax by consuming.

51. See generally SHAVIRO, supra note 1, for an extensive discussion of this issue.
52. If the rate structure is progressive, then the tax paid under a progressive wage tax
may be greater or less than the tax paid under an ex post consumption tax, since the taxes
will be paid by different persons in different years subject (perhaps) to different rates.
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IV. SAVINGS HETEROGENEITY

We have so far assumed that individuals within the same wage class save
the same amounts. If this is true, the tax on the return to savings is merely a
poor substitute for a tax on earnings. With no heterogeneity in savings
decisions, a tax on savings is by assumption the same as a tax on earnings.
Thus, in our running example, each class-, Rich, Middle, and Poor-was
entirely homogeneous-each individual in each of the classes consumed the
same number of figs or saved the same amount. A tax on earnings, therefore,
could replicate the tax on savings.
Earnings or ability classes, however, are likely to include individuals with
different propensities to save, with some individuals being savers and some
spenders (or any range in between). When there is heterogeneity in savings, the
replicating wage tax will only be able to replicate the tax on average savings
for each wage class. Within each class, switching tax systems will redistribute
from spenders to savers. The merits of this type of redistribution (or the
reverse) are precisely the focus of some of the literature on consumption
taxation, and, thus, we must face directly the arguments made in that literature.
We can illustrate the issue using our running example. Suppose that there
are two rich individuals rather than one (Richl and Rich2) and that they differ
in their taste for figs. Richl consumes $30,000 of figs and Rich2 consumes
only $20,000 (both tax inclusive). On average, they consume $25,000 of figs,
as in the example. If the tax adjustment is made as specified in the example, so
that the total labor tax is $62,500, the two rich individuals are, on average,
indifferent. On average, they pay $62,500 under the wage/fig tax and $62,500
under the more progressive wage tax. If we consider ability classes as a whole,
we can replicate the distributive effects of a tax on figs with a more progressive
tax on earnings.
Within the class of the rich, however, the two individuals are not
indifferent. Under the wage/fig tax, Richl paid $50,000 in labor taxes and
$15,000 in fig taxes, or a total of $65,000. Rich2 had total taxes of $60,000.
Under the more progressive wage tax, they both pay $62,500 in taxes. Richl,
who favored figs, is better off by $2500, and Rich2, who favored prunes, is
worse off by $2500. (Conversely, if the tax adjustment were made in the
opposite direction, from wage tax to wage/fig tax, the redistribution would be
in the opposite direction.) The substitution of the more progressive wage tax
for the labor/fig tax redistributes wealth within the class of rich individuals
(even though it does not redistribute among different classes of individuals).
The same would be true for any class of individuals where there is
heterogeneity within the class. Given that such heterogeneity is likely a fact of
life, we must ask whether redistribution from spenders to savers or savers to
spenders is desirable.
Proponents of income taxes argue that redistribution from savers to
spenders is desirable because savers are systematically better off than spenders.
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One prominent reason, associated with Alvin Warren, is that even though in
present value terms their consumption is the same, savers have more total
consumption than spenders and, therefore, are better off.53 A second argument,
not made in the tax literature but often made in the behavioral economics
literature, is that many individuals systematically save too little and would be
better off if they saved more. We explore these arguments below, starting first
with an attempt to set forth the appropriate grounds of the debate and the basic
argument against redistributing from savers to spenders. In Part V, we consider
the argument that savings has value above and beyond the future consumption
and that we need an income tax to tax this
it brings, such as security and power,
54
imputed income from savings.
Before turning to the analysis, it is worth emphasizing two key points
made in the previous Parts. First, the only redistribution we need worry about is
the redistribution within a wage class. A common objection to a consumption
tax is that it redistributes from one wage class to another. In other words, since
the rich save more than the poor, eliminating the tax on the return to saving
benefits the rich. This is the luxury tax argument highlighted above. The
comparison when making the luxury tax argument is between a lawyer who
earns $400,000 per year and a janitor who eams $20,000 per year. A tax on
savings has the effect of a luxury tax, since the wealthy disproportionately
save, and eliminating that tax benefits the wealthy at the expense of the poor.
Thus, a consumption tax increases the burden on the janitors and lessens the
burden on the lawyers--or so it is argued. As discussed above, a consumption
tax can be designed to avoid the entire force of this argument. The sum of wage
and savings taxes on each wage class can be replicated with a wage tax. Thus,
there is no net redistribution from one wage class to another. We do find
intraclass redistribution: the burden of the $400,000-per-year wage earner who
spends rises relative to the $400,000-per-year wage earner who saves; the
burden of the $20,000-per-year wager earner who spends rises relative to
burden of the $20,000-per-year wage earner who saves. It is the desirability of
this change in relative tax burden that we discuss below.
Second, the intraclass redistribution stems only from the treatment of the
risk-free return to savings. The consumption tax is often opposed on the
grounds that, by not taxing the return to investment, it ignores the morally
relevant difference between winners and losers: investments that pay off and
investments that do not. As Michael Graetz said, "lucky gamblers are not the
same as unlucky gamblers." 55 Warren makes the same point: "If A and B have
identical expectations about their financial futures, but A's hopes are dashed,

53. See Warren, supra note 1, at 1097-1101.
54. There is a fourth possibility, which is that savings is an indicator of ability. This
possibility is discussed in Part VI, infra.
55. Michael Graetz, Implementing a ProgressiveConsumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REv.
1575, 1601 (1979).
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while B's wildest dreams are realized,
should not a fair tax system take into
56
account the differences in outcome?
Whatever the merits of treating winners and losers differently, they have
no bearing on the choice between an income tax and a consumption tax. As
noted, both taxes treat returns to risk the same way. If they tax capital at a flat
rate, neither taxes the winners nor helps the losers. If it is desirable to tax risk
using graduated rates, both income and consumption taxes can do so. In
practice, either tax might deviate from this treatment, but there is no reason to
believe that5 7one tax base systematically performs differently than the other in
this regard.
Given these two points, we can turn to the analysis of whether savings
heterogeneity supports an income tax. We begin with the case of rational
savings decisions and then turn to savings myopia and other irrationalities.
A. Rational Savings Decisions

Under standard assumptions, individuals make reasonable consumption
choices, such as whether to consume prunes or figs, chocolate or vanilla, or in
the present or in the future. Under these assumptions, a consumption tax is
preferable to an income tax. As usual, we compare the efficiency and
distributive consequences of the two systems. We can no longer use the Pareto
criteria because the spender may be worse off when we switch to the
replicating wage tax. Nevertheless, equalizing the tax rates on labor incomeby eliminating the indirect tax on labor income due to the tax on savingsproduces welfare gains.
Consider again the effect of the replicating wage tax on the rich in our
example. The tax rate on the rich saver (Richl) goes down from 65% to 62.5%,
and the tax rate on the spender (Rich2) goes up from 60% to 62.5%. The
efficiency gain from reducing the tax rate on labor income for savers would be
greater than the losses from increasing the tax rate on spenders because
efficiency losses increase with the square of the tax rate. The efficiency gains
are similar to the types of gains achieved from reducing the level of rate
graduation. Moreover, there is the additional efficiency gain that is the primary
subject of this Article-the gain from eliminating the distortion in consumption
choices between current consumption and deferred consumption.
There is no reason to sacrifice these efficiency gains to redistribute from
savers to spenders. Although individual circumstances differ, as a general
matter, individuals with the same wages or earnings ability can choose to spend

56. Warren, supra note 1, at 1098.
57. Warren argues that the claim that income taxes do not tax risky returns relies on an
ex ante perspective. Id. at 1105. This argument is incorrect. An individual's consumption is
the same in each period under a Haig-Simons tax and a tax only on the risk-free return. See
generally Kaplow, supra note 35.
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or save, much like they can choose to consume prunes or figs. The interest rate
determines the relative prices of future and present consumption just like
various factors determine the relative prices of prunes and figs. Given these
prices, there is no reason to assume that individuals who choose one or the
other-prunes or figs, present or future-are systematically better off. Indeed,
if spenders and savers are equally well off when the return to savings is not
taxed, an income tax has worse distributive consequences than a consumption
tax because it puts spenders and savers in unequal positions after tax.
Therefore, a consumption tax remains more efficient than an income tax and,
even taking into account savings heterogeneity, has equally good, and perhaps
better, distributive effects.
The analysis above was implicitly ex ante. It assumed that we could
compare individuals with different savings preferences by looking at their
initial positions and discounting their savings to present value. Warren
famously criticizes this position by arguing that we should analyze the effects
of savings decisions (and taxes) from an ex post perspective rather than an ex
ante perspective. 58 The argument is that, ex post, the saver has more total
consumption than the spender and is thus better off. It is one thing, argues
Warren, to use present value to discount future consumption as against present
consumption and quite another to use the same discount rate to match present
consumption against past consumption. The fact that this latter form of
discounting seems inappropriate or odd casts doubt upon the present value
concepts underlying many consumption tax arguments. With characteristic
economy and rhetorical flourish, Warren manages to build his argument into a
single sentence: "It is not at all obvious that consumption of a bottle of fine
wine 30 years ago is, in any meaningful sense, equivalent to consumption of
59
several cases today."
Once we recognize that the only difference between an income tax and a
consumption tax is the taxation of the risk-free return to savings, however, the
difference between an ex ante perspective and an ex post perspective
evaporates. All of the information known ex post is known ex ante, so any
60
decision about who is better off can be made at either point in time.
Therefore, it cannot be the case that fairness depends on one perspective or
another.
Moreover, even from an ex post perspective, if we assume that individuals
made reasonable savings decisions, there would be no reason to believe that
individuals who chose the wine thirty years ago over several cases today are
worse off. As long as the two choices are available (and recall that we are

58. Warren, supra note 1, at 1097-1101.
59. Id.at 1100.
60. The arguments in the philosophical or political economics literature in favor of an
ex post perspective uniformly rely on risk. See, e.g., SEN, supra note 42. Where there is no
risk, these arguments do not apply.
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discussing individuals in the same ability or earnings class who, by assumption,
make reasonable choices), we have no reason to think one or the other is better
off.
Nevertheless, Warren's hypothetical creates a powerful intuitive argument
against discounting. We suspect the power of Warren's hypothetical, however,
lies not in the perspective from which one discounts but from the startlingly
high discount rate used in his example. The equivalence of one bottle to twoand-a-half (the midpoint of "several") cases implies an inflation-adjusted
discount rate of approximately 12%. The riskless interest rate is generally
estimated at around 1 . 5 %.6 1 At that more realistic rate, the equivalent trade-off
would be a bottle of wine thirty years ago and about a bottle and a half of wine
today. The individual who consumes several cases of wine today seems better
off than the individual who consumed a single bottle thirty years ago because,
in market terms and from the
perspective of all but those with the highest
62
internal discount rates, he is.
Consider an equally stylized, but somewhat more realistic, example. A, B,
and C each save $10,000 earned from a summer job in their last year at college.
A decides to use the money to pay for a European trip she takes with her
significant other. The two stay in youth hostels and eat at cheap cafes. B saves
his money and takes a similar trip with his wife ten years later. They stay in
two-star hotels and eat at two-star restaurants. C also saves her money and
takes a similar trip with her significant other thirty years later. They stay in
three-star hotels and eat at three-star restaurants.
Our hypothetical also assumes a high discount rate (although not as
extreme a discount rate as Warren's). One cannot invest at the riskless interest
rate and upgrade from a youth hostel today to a three-star hotel in thirty years.
We have, in this respect, built our hypothetical to make the consumption
pattern favored by the saver, C, look better. Nonetheless, we have no intuition
as to whether C has higher welfare than A. A has had her pleasure earlier, and
another thirty years in which to enjoy the memories of her trip; C has higher
explicit consumption and perhaps has had years of pleasure anticipating her
trip. More importantly, if A, B, and C each had the ability to choose when to

61. See Reed Shuldiner, Taxation and Risk (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors). Warren was writing in 1980 when inflation was very high, which might justify

the high discount rate. In this example, however, since we are dealing with goods rather than
money, we can ignore the inflation rate. Any inflation-related change in the price of wine is
already built into the example.
62. The selection of wine as a consumption good raises other problems, though
perhaps not ones that directly affect the hypothetical. Wine is an acquired taste that takes
time and experience to appreciate. As one develops a nose for wine, each subsequent bottle
becomes more satisfying, such that the first bottle contributes to the enjoyment from later
bottles. See Paul Samuelson, Probability, Utility, and the Independence Axiom, 20
ECONOMETRICA 670, 674 (1952) ("The amount of wine I drank yesterday and will drink

tomorrow can be expected to have effects upon my today's indifference slope between wine
and milk.").
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take their trips, we cannot say that one is better off than the other, even if our
own preferences happen to match one of their choices. As long as they make
reasonable choices, the fact that their preferences differ should not cause us to
believe one is better off than the other.
We conclude from this analysis that arguments in favor of an income tax
based on savings heterogeneity must rely on a belief that individuals do not
make good savings decisions. Virtually all developed societies have massive
programs, such as social security programs, based in part on savings myopia,
and it is possible that an income tax can be similarly justified. In the next Part,
we analyze these arguments.
B. Savings Myopia and SimilarProblems
An income tax, as discussed, can be thought of as a uniform tax on labor
plus a tax on savings and an equivalent subsidy on spending. (This is the
"renormalization" discussed in Part I.) If individuals systematically made bad
savings/spending decisions, these distortions might be justified, even if they
would not be in the case of figs and prunes. We review this argument here. We
begin with a brief overview of the literature on savings decisions and then
discuss whether problems with savings decisions can be used to support an
income tax.
1. Experimentalstudies
The subject of intertemporal choice has generated a great deal of literature,
much of it in the relatively new fields of behavioral economics or decision
theory. Researchers in these fields commonly use controlled experiments, with
college students as paid subjects, to gain insight into the determinants of
consumption patterns. For example, an experiment might ask subjects how
much they would pay or would have to be paid to move the delivery date of a
consumer durable forward or backward,6 3 or the way in which
they would like
64
to schedule a few free meals at a favorite French restaurant.
One persistent experimental result is that the decisions subjects make
reveal extraordinarily high short-term discount rates. In one early study,
subjects were asked how much they would need to be paid in the future to
forgo $15 today; the results implied short-term discount rates well over
100 .65 These results have been replicated in a variety of later experiments.

63. See George F. Loewenstein, Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice, 34 MGMT.
Sci. 200, 205-06 (1988).
64. George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Preferencesfor Sequences of Outcomes,
100 PSYCHOL. REv. 91 (1993).
65. Richard H. Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 EcoN.
LETrERs 201 (1981).
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Discount rates fall with time, however, becoming much lower and virtually
constant after the first year. 6 7 The declining rate of time preference is
commonly described as "hyperbolic discounting." Moreover, the high
short68

term discount rates fall dramatically as the amount at stake increases.
While hyperbolic discounting seems to present evidence that some
individuals will spend more than is rational--or at least more than would be
expected under standard discount utility theory--other experimental results
point in the opposite direction. For example, most subjects prefer an improving
sequence of consumption even if this means deferring present consumption
with no interest: $10 today and $12 next year is preferred over $12 today and
$10 next year. 69 Thus, improving wage profiles are preferred over wage
profiles that start high and decline, although the latter provide higher present
value consumption./
These and other results are sensitive to the construction or framing of the
experiment. 7 1 Some of the more startling anomalies can be explained in a
manner consistent with rational decisionmaking. For example, high discount
rates may reflect the subjects' perception of the risk associated with deferred
consumption. 72 A preference for rising consumption may conflict with standard
discount utility theory but is consistent with the so-called "new hedonics"
literature, which shows (or purports to show) that perceived welfare is affected
not only by the absolute level of consumption, but also by the pattern of

consumption.

73

66. See Uri Benzion et al., Discount Rates Inferredfrom Decisions: An Experimental
Study, 35 MGMT. Sci. 270 (1989); Gretchen B. Chapman, Temporal Discountingand Utility
for Health and Money, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION

771 (1996); Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical
Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 360 (2002); Daniel A. Redelmeir & Daniel N. Heller,

Time Preference in Medical Decision Making and Cost Effectiveness Analysis, 13 MED.
DECISION MAKING 212 (1993).

67. Frederick et al., supra note 66, at 360-61.
68. See id. at 363, 370, 373-74; Leonard Green et al., Rate of Temporal Discounting
Decreases with Amount of Reward, 25 MEMORY & COGNITION 715 (1997).
69. Frederick et al., supra note 66, at 363-64.

70. Id. at 365; George Loewenstein & Nachum Sicherman, Do Workers Prefer
Increasing Wage Profiles?, 9 J. LAB. ECON. 67, 75 (1991).
71. For example, several studies show that the discount rate is sensitive to the number
of periods in which a given unit of time is partitioned. Subjects show higher discount rates if
asked to discount consumption on a month-by-month basis than if they are asked to discount
consumption on an annual basis. See Christopher K. Hsee et al., The Relative Weighting of
Position and Velocity in Satisfaction, 2 PSYCHOL. SCI. 263 (1991); Daniel Reed, Is Time
DiscountingHyperbolic or Subadditive?, 23 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2001).
72. Frederick et al., supra note 66, at 382.
73. For a summary of this literature, see WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC
PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
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2. Retirement savings and other intertemporalconsumption decisions

Economists have attempted to measure discount rates by looking at how
individuals respond to choices involving temporal tradeoffs. Many of these
studies involve choices in which the discount rate may be confounded by a lack
of information. In this category are studies that show that individuals are
unwilling to pay extra for energy-saving appliances, that they are willing to
trade in annuities for lump-sum payments with lower present value (suggesting
high discount rates), or that they are willing to expose themselves to increased
risks tomorrow for higher pay today (suggesting discount rates the authors
deem "reasonable"). 74
A significant body of recent literature examines the adequacy of retirement
savings. A number of economists have concluded that many lower-income
individuals, in particular, save too little. 75 Evidence for this position includes
savings behavior consistent with hyperbolic discount rates, 76 and survey results
that show many Americans wish they had saved more, 77 a lack of knowledge,
and reliance on faulty heuristics in making savings decisions. 78 Other
researchers have concluded that the savings decisions of the poor are rational.79

74. See Jerry A. Hausman, IndividualDiscount Rates and the Purchaseand Utilization
of Energy-Using Durables, 10 BELL J. EcON. 33 (1979); Michael J. Moore & W. Kip
Viscusi, Models for Estimating Discount Rates for Long-Term Health Risks Using Labor
Market Data, 3 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 381 (1990); Henry Ruderman et al., The Behavior
of the Market for Energy Efficiency in Residential Appliances Including Heating and
Cooling Equipment, 8 ENERGY J. 101 (1987); W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Rates of
Time Preference and Valuations of the DurationofLife, 38 J. PuB. ECON. 297 (1989); John
T. Warner & Saul Pleeter, The PersonalDiscount Rate: Evidence from Military Downsizing
Programs, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 33 (2001) (finding that where service personnel were offered
choice of lump-sum payment or annuity with an implicit 17.5% rate of return, more than
three-fourths of enlisted personnel and half the officers selected a lump-sum payment). But
see Emily Lawrance, Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidence from Panel Data,
119 J. POL. ECON. 54 (1991) (finding a negative correlation between discount rates and
socioeconomic factors such as levels of education and income).
75. See, e.g., Steven F. Venti, Choice, Behavior, and Retirement Savings 5 (2004),
available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/-bventi/Papers/ventisavings,_12-04.pdf. On the
whole, the research indicates that a substantial proportion of, and perhaps most, households
in the United States fail to save "enough" income for retirement.
76. See, e.g., Karen E. Dynan et al., Do the Rich Save More?, 122 J. POL. ECON. 397,
416 (2004) (finding definite relationship between income and saving rates but little support
for explanations that relied solely on time-preference discounting).
77. See James M. Choi et al., For Better or Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings
Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81 (David A. Wise ed., 2004). For
a general discussion of this issue, see Venti, supra note 75.
78. See Venti, supranote 75, at 4-6.
79. See R. Glenn Hubbard et al., PrecautionarySaving and Social Insurance, 103 J.
POL. ECON. 360 (1995); see also C.D. Carrol & A.A. Samwick, The Nature of Precautionary
Wealth, 40 J. MONETARY ECON. 41 (1997) (noting savings of poor consistent with "buffer

stock" model of savings, in which consumers spend most of their lives trying to maintain
modest "target" wealth-income ratios and begin saving for retirement only around age fifty).
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A recent survey of the literature on this subject concluded that the savings
behavior of the upcoming group of baby-boomer retirees is comparable to that
of earlier generations and that, due to increased wealth, fewer members of the
this generation will fall below the poverty line. 80 On the other hand, the study
also concluded that some segment of the population saves too little to meet
generally accepted standards of retirement adequacy.
3. Lessons from the literature

This review of the literature illustrates that our current understanding of
savings decisions is unclear. Suppose, however, that after further study we
ultimately conclude that there is a class of individuals who make systematically
bad savings decisions or, alternatively, that we are forced to make a decision
now and this conclusion is our best guess. The most likely case, and the only
one we will consider, is that this class
of individuals systematically saves too
81
little-i.e., they have savings myopia.
An income tax, by taxing those who save and reducing the burden on
spenders, would redistribute in the right direction in this case. The benefit of
this redistribution would have to be weighed against the efficiency losses
created by taxing future consumption at a higher rate than present consumption.
Depending on the behavioral responses, size, and heterogeneity of the relevant
groups, this redistribution may be desirable.
An income tax designed to help those with savings myopia, however, has
another consequence: it increases the cost of saving, thus encouraging spending
over saving and exacerbating the very problem it is supposed to ameliorate.
That is, by lowering the price of spending relative to saving, it might cause
those who spend too much to spend that much more. It is entirely possible that
these behavioral responses reverse all distributional benefits.
Note that this is not the normal efficiency/redistribution tradeoff. In the
normal case, individuals who are hurt by the redistribution (i.e., they are
distributed away from) adjust their behavior to avoid the impact of the
redistribution. In this case, individuals who are supposed to be helped might
adjust their behavior to offset the effect of the help.
Indeed, reducing, rather than increasing, the tax on savings is the
conventional tax response to a perceived problem that some individuals save
too little, in keeping with the paternalist rationale for subsidies on other
beneficial goods and services, such as education and health care. Seen in this

80. ROBERT SHACKLETON, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BABY BOOMERS'

RETIREMENT

PROSPECTS: AN OVERVIEW 32 (2003), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc
4863/11-26-BabyBoomers.pdf.

81. An alternative possibility is that there is a class of individuals who systematically
save too much. One might think of the Japanese savers of the 1990s or of American
Depression-era babies, both known for their extraordinarily high savings rates.
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light, supporting an income tax, which encourages spending out of solicitude
for those who are made worse off by spending, is perverse. It is like noting the
welfare-reducing effects of smoking but then seeking to help smokers by
reducing the price of cigarettes.
To the extent we are concerned about those with savings myopia, there are
alternative responses to the problem that are likely to be superior to increasing
the cost of saving. For example, mandatory savings programs, such as Social
Security, do not have the problem of subsidizing the very activity to be
discouraged. If successful, these programs increase the welfare of the spender,
thereby reducing the need for redistribution to him. Moreover, savers may be
only minimally affected by such programs. Given the fungibility of savings,
they may be able to reduce spending elsewhere in their portfolios. A complete
analysis of mandatory savings is well beyond the scope of this Article. Our
only points on this topic are that an income tax may be precisely the wrong
solution for aiding myopic spenders and that better tools may be available.
The savings-myopia case for an income tax, while possible, is extremely
tenuous. We would have to believe there is a significant class of individuals
with savings myopia, and making savings more, rather than less, expensive is a
good way to help these individuals. Assuming that there is some benefit to
these individuals, the benefit would have to outweigh the efficiency costs (with
respect to nonmyopic individuals) of taxing future consumption more highly
than present consumption. Finally, we would have to believe that an income tax
is an appropriate instrument for helping those with savings myopia, particularly
when compared with more direct solutions such as mandatory savings plans or
savings incentives. The extent to which these conditions are met is an empirical
question, and while it is possible that they are met, we believe it to be unlikely.
V. DOES SAVINGS BRING VALUE BEYOND FUTURE CONSUMPTION?
Consumption tax opponents often argue that savers, unlike spenders, get
intangible benefits from holding wealth and that these benefits are not captured
by a consumption tax. For example, Murphy and Nagel argue that it should be
obvious that wealth is an independent source of welfare, quite apart from the
fact that some of it may be consumed later. 82 As Henry Simons famously stated
in 1938, "[i]n a world where capital accumulation proceeds as it does now,
there is something sadly inadequate about the idea of saving as postponed
consumption." 83 Commentators typically mention
benefits from saving such as
84
security, political power, and social standing.

82. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 12.
83. HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 97 (1938).
84. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 12, at 115; see also DEP'T OF TREASURY, 1 TAX
REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 209 (1984) ("If accumulation
of wealth has value beyond the consumption that it can buy-if it confers power, prestige, or
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Strictly speaking, an income tax misses these intangible benefits as well. It
is argued, however, that by taxing the explicit return to savings, an income tax
levies an indirect tax on these benefits, and thus an income tax offers a secondbest way of taxing the imputed benefits of wealth. For the reasons described
below, this argument is incorrect.
First, the argument, even if true, would not raise distributional issues under
the replicating consumption or wage tax proposal we outline. To the extent
savings are constant within wage classes, the sources of welfare or utility from
savings are irrelevant for distributional purposes. Distributional equity is held
constant by the consumption or wage tax. To the extent there is savings
heterogeneity, untaxed intangible benefits from wealth would create
distributional concerns only if we believe spenders do not maximize their own
welfare, and even then it is by no means clear that taxing these benefits would
ameliorate, rather than exacerbate, the welfare loss caused by excessive
spending. Because intangible benefits from savings are simply a subset of
benefits from savings, the analysis in the previous Part of this Article would
extend to these forms of benefits.
The primary issue raised by the intangible-benefits-from-wealth argument
is efficiency. If part of the consumption stream from savings, the intangible
benefits of wealth, is untaxed, it will be tax-preferred over other forms of
consumption. People might seek too much security, status, and prestige. 85 If
correct, we might be concerned about these efficiency consequences.
Efficiency concerns, however, are baseless. A consumption tax accurately
captures the consumption of intangible benefits associated with savings
because those benefits are a function of net after-tax consumption, rather than
the gross amount of savings. A consumption tax reduces consumption and, in
so doing, reduces those benefits. The point is ably made by Shaviro:
Why does wealth offer security, political power, and social standing? The
answer must be because of its value-that is, because of what it can be used to
buy.... [S]avings and wealth are indeed subsidiary to consumption in that
they derive their value entirely from that potential use, whether its exercise is
proximate or not. That ability to buy things is, after all, the difference between
86
real money and play money from board games such as Monopoly and Life.

A consumption tax, by taxing goods purchased with savings, taxes these
intangible benefits. For example, assume that the knowledge of available
consumption gives a saver the sense of security because she knows that when
she desires or needs something, she will have the money available. The
imposition of a consumption tax reduces the amount available. This, in turn,
reduces the security (or power or prestige) associated with the savings.
peace of mind-then annual consumption does not measure equals.").
85. Robert Frank argues the opposite-that individuals will seek prestige through
excess consumption, not excess savings. See generally ROBERT FRANK, LUXURY FEVER:
WHY MONEY FAILS To SATISFY INAN ERA OF EXCESS (1999).
86. SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 106.
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We can also argue that power and prestige likely come more from labor
than from savings. To see why this may be the case, it is useful to compare an
individual with a $20 million diversified portfolio that provides explicit
consumption of $2 million a year with a group of chief executive officers
whose salaries provide the same explicit consumption. As noted above, to the
extent the individual with the brokerage account realizes welfare from security,
that welfare is a function of after-tax consumption and is effectively taxed by a
consumption tax. The securities in her portfolio are unlikely to give her any
power whatsoever over the companies in which she invests. Most other forms
of wealth-related power seem a function of after-tax consumption rather than
before-tax savings. The power over perspective beneficiaries, for example, is
ultimately a function of the amount of (after-tax) consumption any gifts might
fund. Political power realized through the prospect of contributions would also
be a function of after-tax consumption, since contributions would be treated
(then, as now) as nondeductible consumption under a cash-flow tax. The only
apparent case in which power might be a function of before-tax savings is
power over charitable organizations attributable to future donations, since gifts
would presumably be deductible under a consumption tax as under an income
tax. Any prestige or respect that comes from wealth is much more likely to be a
function of her past or future consumption, which is or will be public, than the
before-tax amount of her holdings. Again, since a consumption tax reduces the
amount of consumption, it will reduce the imputed income from that form of
consumption-related benefit.
The executives, in contrast, realize enormous power relative to their
explicit consumption or the capitalized value of their future consumption
stream. They are apt to have an army of subordinates, to be able to decide on
the allocation of substantial amounts of capital, and so on. They are likely
accorded more respect than the holder of the brokerage account both because
respect often accompanies power and because, to the extent respect
accompanies wealth, their wealth is more visible.
The same relationship between savings and wages and these sorts of
intangible benefits seems to hold for individuals with lower levels of wealth.
An attorney with an income of $250,000 and a certain level of consumption
probably has more power and prestige than someone with an equivalent
amount of consumption financed through a return from savings.
The final objection to the imputed-income-from-savings argument is that
the rationale seems unclear for including within the tax base these forms of
intangible benefits but excluding other intangible benefits and burdens
associated with consumption or income.87 As noted in the previous Part,
consumption may bring with it regret, anticipation, pleasant memories, and the

87. See Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REv.

1477, 1504 n.61 (1994) (noting that other intangible benefits, such as the prestige associated
with joining a country club, are not taxed).
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like. Labor carries with it an even wider variety of intangible benefits,
including the very benefits mentioned in connection with savings. Focusing
only on a few of the benefits and burdens associated with deferred consumption
is apt to produce misleading policy proposals.
The argument for taxing savings because it brings power, prestige, and
security ultimately relies on a rhetorical trick (or perhaps mistake). It depends
on describing the utility gained from saving as coming from two or more
sources, future consumption and power/prestige/security, while the utility from
other forms of consumption comes from one source, enjoyment of the good.
We can, however, describe the utility from almost any item as coming from
multiple sources. The utility we gain from eating well comes from both the
good flavors and the nutrition. The utility from exercise comes from the
endorphins and the fitness. This change in the description of the benefits of
eating well or exercise, however, should not lead us to want to tax them more.
VI. QUALIFICATIONS
As noted in the Introduction, recent extensions of AS 1976 show that the
optimal tax system might be very complex. The discussion so far has focused
on what we believe to be the core issues presented by their argument and those
issues that most legal analysts have focused on in thinking about income and
consumption taxation. By doing so, the discussion risks oversimplifying the
results in the literature. This Part briefly discusses how two qualifications to the
AS 1976 argument might lead away from a pure consumption tax to a system
of varying taxes or subsidies on many goods or activities, including
savings/future consumption.
The first qualification, which affects the efficiency argument found in Part
I.C above, is the possibility that any good, including future consumption, is a
"relative complement" to leisure. An economic complement is something
whose use increases with increased use of the complementary item. Sugar is a
complement to coffee. A relative complement to leisure is something that is
more of a complement to leisure (i.e., its consumption increases more when
leisure increases) than other things are. 88 For example, long novels and hikes
might be relative complements to leisure.
Taxing relative complements to leisure would be efficient if we had a wage
tax. The wage tax distorts the decision of whether to work or enjoy leisure.
Taxing relative complements to leisure reduces that distortion. The same

88. The technical name for the assumption that no commodity is a relative
complement for leisure is "weak separability." Under weak separability, an individual's
utility function can be stated as a function of two variables: work effort and a function of
commodities. That is, utility is equal to U(w, v(ci)) where the w is work effort, ci are the
various commodities one can consume, and v is a subutility function that determines the
utility from consumption.

HeinOnline -- 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1451 2005-2006

1452

STANFORD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1413

reasoning implies that goods that are relative substitutes for leisure ought to be
subsidized, since their consumption reduces the temptation to loaf instead of
work, thereby reducing the distortion caused by the wage tax. The question
here is whether savings/future consumption is a relative complement to leisure.
If it is, then, implementation problems aside, it should be taxed at a rate
determined by its relative complementarity to leisure. On the other hand, if
savings/future consumption is a relative substitute for leisure, it ought to be
subsidized. The ideal tax on savings would be negative. The government might,
for example, give taxpayers an annual credit equal to 1% of savings. There is
little reason to believe that savings is either a relative complement or a relative
substitute to leisure. Armchair reasoning suggests that the answer will be
complex and does not point in any one direction. 89 Suppose that we can
increase an individual's resources at one of two times: when he is working or
when he is retired. The choice of an income tax is essentially a choice to
increase resources early in life, when a person is working, and reduce them
later, when he is retired. If we increase his resources when he is working, he is
likely to take time off from work to spend these resources, increasing the
labor/leisure distortion. If we increase his resources when retired, he already is
not working and, therefore, there is no increase in labor/leisure distortion. This
result would suggest that savings is a relative substitute for leisure and that we
should have a capital subsidy. A capital subsidy, however, might make
individuals retire earlier, offsetting the above effect. We do not have a strong
intuition about the net result.
More generally, while it is the case that a pure wage tax might be improved
by taxing relative complements to leisure and subsidizing relative substitutes
for leisure, it is hard to determine what such taxes might look like. We would
want to tax items that take a long time to consume but are relatively
inexpensive and subsidize quickly consumed, expensive items. For example,
we might want to tax long novels or hiking gear and subsidize rock concerts.
Similarly, we might want to tax food prepared at home and subsidize food
eaten at restaurants-the opposite pattern from most VATs in the world
today. 90 The rate of tax (or subsidy) would depend on the strength of the
complementary or substitution relationship. While the technical economics
literature views the "relative complementarity problem" as important from a
practical standpoint, 9 1 it has no obvious bearing on the choice between an
income and consumption tax.

89. We thank Louis Kaplow for suggesting this reasoning.
90. See Aled ab Iowerth & John Whalley, Efficiency Considerations and the
Exemption of Foodfrom Sales and Value Added Taxes, 35 CAN. J. ECON. 166, 167 (2002);
cf Louis Kaplow, On the Undesirability of Commodity Taxation Even When Income
Taxation Is Not Optimal (Harvard's John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion
Paper No. 470, 2004), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/470kap

low.php (arguing that any commodity tax in an income tax system will be suboptimal).
91. See Deaton, supra note 3.
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The second qualification to AS 1976 relates to savings heterogeneity,
discussed in Part IV. The qualification arises if savings is a signal of ability
separate from wages. Nichols and Zeckhauser call goods that provide these
sorts of signals "indicator goods." 92 The idea is that at any given level of
income, those high-ability individuals who are shirking-i.e., choosing leisure
over labor because of the tax on labor-will be likely to consume a different set
of items than those who have lower ability but are working hard. These items
are indicators of ability-thus the term indicator goods. Because individuals
with the same labor income but different abilities make different choices with
respect to the indicator goods, the replicating wage tax cannot differentiate
among individuals on this basis. The presence of indicator goods, therefore,
provides an additional tool (beyond wage or consumption taxation) to identify
(and tax) those of high ability. That is, by taxing indicator goods, we can tax
those of high ability in ways that a wage tax cannot.
Indicator goods did not arise in AS 1976 because individuals were
assumed to be identical except with respect to their wage rates. That is, in their
model, individuals varied only in one way, wage rates, and did not have
differing preferences. The only way to differentiate among individuals,
therefore, was based on wages. It is highly likely that individuals are
heterogeneous in their tastes, so the possibility of indicator goods is real.
Finding examples of indicator goods is tricky because we need to be able
to observe ability. That is, we have to find items that those of high ability
consume (or fail to consume) independent of their earnings. Because ability
cannot be observed directly, we have to make implicit judgments about various
tastes as a signal of ability.
93
Nichols and Zeckhauser do not offer any examples of indicator goods.
(They use a hypothetical to illustrate the issue, but they do not explicitly state
that they believe the hypothetical to be an indicator good.) Kaplow suggests
that highbrow culture is such a good.94 Long, abstract novels and plays,
modem art, and classical music arguably require greater ability to appreciate.
Therefore, those with higher ability are more likely to consume these items
independent of income, and these items thus should be taxed. Saez uses the
example of smoking tobacco. 95 He argues that those with higher ability tend to
smoke less, and "this clearly cannot be due to the mechanical fact that they
have higher disposable income." 96 All else equal, a subsidy for smoking or,
equivalently, a tax on "not smoking" (the "activity" of the high-ability people)
92. Albert Nichols & Richard Zeckhauser, Targeting Transfers Through Restrictions
on Recipients, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 372, 375 (1982).
93. Id.
94. Louis Kaplow, Theory of Taxation and Public Economics 12 (draft on file with
authors).
95. Emmanuel Saez, The Desirability of Commodity Taxation Under Non-Linear
Income Taxation and Heterogeneous Tastes, 83 J. PuB. ECON. 217, 225-26 (2002).

96. Id.
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would be desirable if Saez is correct. The reason is that a tax on individuals for
failing to smoke cannot be replicated with a labor income tax, and the activity
of not smoking correlates with ability. Blumkin and Sadka suggest that
us to tax those
education might be an indicator good. Taxing education allows
97
not.
does
wages
taxing
merely
that
ways
in
of high ability
Our question is whether to tax the return to savings (at the same rate as the
tax on labor income). Many of those who argue for a tax on savings make
precisely the wrong argument in this respect. They argue that only the wealthy
can save-the poor must spend all of their resources merely to survive. This
claim, however, suggests that saving depends entirely on resources rather than
being related to some innate ability. The AS 1976 argument shows that this
rationale is wrong because a tax on savings is merely a substitute for a tax on
earnings, and a direct tax on earnings is superior. Instead, for a tax on savings
to produce welfare gains, savings would have to depend on ability, not
earnings. Those with low ability would have to save less than those with high
ability, even at the same income level (or changes in savings would have to be
different than changes in income).
The most well-known proponent for assertions of this sort is Saez. 9 8 He
suggests that savings is an indicator good. (He does not use that term, but his
definition is essentially the same as Nichols and Zeckhauser's.) Therefore, we
would want to tax savings as a way of taxing ability. 99 He cites a single paper
for support but says that the claim is also supported generally in the
literature. 1 00 Our search of the literature, however, shows that the correlation of
savings with ability is unknown. The reason is that we have no independent
measure of ability. The most that can be said is that there does seem to be a
correlation between savings and financial sophistication. Financial
sophistication is likely to be correlated with education, which in turn may be
correlated with ability. In addition, holding education constant, innate ability
may be related to numeracy, financial sophistication, and, therefore, savings.
97. Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka, A Case for Taxing Education 12-13 (CESifo
Working Paper No. 1440, Apr. 2005), available at http://SSRN.com/abstract-700682.

98. See Saez, supra note 95, at 228; see also Gordon, supra note 3.
99. Even if one accepts Saez's claim that savings is an indicator good, his conclusion
may not follow. He argues that "higher income individuals save more not only because they
have more income to save but also because they might have a better financial education and
be more aware of the need to save for retirement." Saez, supra note 95, at 228. Savings rates
under his argument, however, do not depend directly on ability. Instead, they depend on
education, which in turn depends on ability. Rather than taxing savings, however, we could
tax education as the more direct signal of ability.
A second problem with Saez's argument is that he only shows that a marginal tax on
some commodities might be optimal and illustrates this argument with a two-period example
and a tax on savings. In the two-period example, a tax on savings can be marginal, but in the
more realistic, infinite horizon case, it cannot. None of his proofs cover the case when the
tax on the commodity is nonmarginal, so we cannot learn anything from his model about
whether a tax on savings is desirable.
100. Id. (citing Lawrance, supra note 74).
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There is, thus, some support, albeit weak and indirect, for the characterization
of savings as an indicator good. Of course, there are bound to be countless
indicator goods more closely tied to ability. For example, if savings is an
indicator good because it reflects education, perhaps education is an even more
direct signal of ability and should be taxed. 10 1 Moreover, the fact that savings
may be an indicator good tells us very little about how it should be taxed. Thus
far, economists have only been able to show that welfare increases as we move
from no tax on indicator goods to an infinitely small tax on such goods, and
they cannot characterize what the actual taxes should look like.
In the end, arguments of the sort made by Saez may very well end up
supporting some tax on capital (and countless other indicator goods). 10 2 The
answer will depend on further development of the models and the empirics. If
income tax advocates need a place to hang their hat, it would be here, but the
arguments at this point are sufficiently theoretical and tenuous that we cannot
say they currently support an income tax.
CONCLUSION

Supporters of an income tax have argued that any efficiency gains realized
from switching to a consumption tax are overstated. They argue that
eliminating the tax on savings will require higher taxes on wages and that any
efficiency gains from eliminating the first tax will be reduced or offset by the
efficiency loss from increasing the latter tax.
Supporters of an income tax also make a number of related normative
arguments. They argue that a consumption tax is regressive because it reduces
the tax burden on savers, and savings rates rise with income or wealth. They
also argue that among those with equal opportunity sets, those who save are
better off than those who spend. Savers are better judges of their own welfare
than are spenders, and, in addition, savers benefit from the nontaxation of
imputed income from savings.
We show that none of these arguments is correct. The tax on savings is a
tax on labor that produces that savings, and it is a particularly inefficient tax on
that labor. Replacing that tax with a direct tax on labor, or an economically
equivalent consumption tax, will generate efficiency gains and appropriately
tax most forms of imputed income, realized savings, and deferred consumption.
It will also leave the tax burden unchanged among those with equal wages or
those who, for other reasons, find themselves with equal opportunity sets.
Our analysis is based on a comparison of ideal tax regimes. A comparison
of nonideal systems would likely strengthen our conclusion. While we think the

101. See Blumkin & Sadka, supra note 97.
102. See Saez, supra note 95, at 228-29.
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arguments based on ideal tax regimes are important, the true Achilles' heel of
comprehensive income taxation is likely to be implementation. 103

103. See William D. Andrews, The Achilles'Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax,
in NEW DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980s, at 278 (Charles E. Walker &

Mark A. Bloomfield eds., 1983) ("[O]ur failure to live up to the comprehensive income tax
ideal has also proved to be remarkably durable.").
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